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MEMORANDA

OF THE

CONTEST IN SPAIN,

BY

SIR DE LACY EVANS, M.P.

LIEUT.-GENERAL, SPANISH NATIONAL ARMY.

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CONTEST IN SPAIN,

January 1840.

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LONDON:

JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.

MDCCCXL.

880.

BIBLIOTHECA·BODLEIANA

TO THE

ELECTORS OF WESTMINSTER.

GENTLEMEN,

INDEBTED to your kind permission for the satisfaction of having personally taken a part in the contest to which these pages refer, to none can I address them more appropriately than to you. They may serve to mark the course of events which have led to the present state of the Spanish question,—and throw, at the same time, some additional light on the character of the two great parties now contending for power in this country.

The efforts of one of the most considerable of the Continental nations, for the recovery, under their constitutional Sovereign, of ancient and dearly valued rights, cannot but merit the sympathy of every friend of freedom and improvement,—who appreciates our comparative advantages of civil and religious liberty, and remembers that we also were unable to achieve them, without passing through a similar ordeal.

The triumph of our Foreign policy in Spain is that of the principle of free institutions over a coalition of the Anti-Reformers of England, and the Absolutists of the North—it is a triumph of enlightened views and generous feelings over a Rebellion, having for its object Despotism and the Inquisition:—and, in whatever way we regard it, social, commercial, or political, will not only confer blessings on those directly concerned, but cause its genial influence to be felt throughout Europe.

I congratulate you, Gentlemen, on the success, now in such immediate prospect, of a cause peculiarly identified with the honour and interests of England,—a result which, you are well aware, I have always ventured to anticipate—though I could not, until the recent termination of the war in the Basque Provinces, have fully entered into the subject without injury to the public service.

I have the honour to remain,

Your obliged and faithful servant,

DE LACY EVANS.

Jan. 1840.

Vera
Echovia
Yrun
FUENTERABIA
Oy
Lezo
Alza
Hernani
S. SEBASTIAN
FRANCE
BAY OF BISCAY


To Pamplona by Ozarzuza, Vera, and Vera
To Velate
N
arzun
S. Marco
Astigarraga
Hernani
Orihuela
Andoain
S.t Sebastian
To Pamplona by Lecumberri, and Los Alduides 3 or 4 Days March
Tolosa
To Bilbao
River Urumea
by Jo.s Wyld, Geographer to the Queen, Charing Cross East.

MEMORANDA,

&c. &c.

"In the sixteenth century, Spain was the most powerful of the European monarchies, her armies were the best disciplined and appointed, her authority was the most widely extended and the most readily obeyed. But in the great convulsions produced by the Reformation, she, for her misfortune, was not disturbed."

A succession, at the period alluded to, of able and ambitious but bigoted sovereigns, who turned

their adventitious power against the liberties of their subjects,—the remarkable disposition of the latter in that era, owing to a long course of preceding events, to acquiesce in usurpations assuming the garb of religion,—the institution of the Inquisition, the most fearful engine of tyranny that ever marred the well-being of a state,—and the consequences, under those circumstances, of an isolated secure position,—contributed to the decline of this great monarchy.

But Spain has now been engaged in a vital struggle for the recovery of her proper position in the scale of nations;—and though shorn of her ancient splendour, she retains, towards a fortunate issue,—an ample, intact and most fertile territory, the foundation of her former greatness, and the noblest situated in Europe.—Her population* is also yet numerous, and still characterised by highly valuable qualities.

During the deplorable interval of almost uninterrupted decay, for more than two hundred years, which followed the overthrow of the constitutional privileges of this people, there existed (to preserve

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* 14,000,000.—Estimated to have increased since 1808 by 3,000,000,—and probably capable of reaching 30,000,000.

as alleged the purity of religion (?),* a rigorous prevention of all useful instruction or free inquiry;—notwithstanding which, the opinions and intellectual improvements of the 18th century, at length gained considerable diffusion, and commenced their genial influence.

1808.

The *Invasion by Napoleon* first developed this unperceived amelioration. The more enlightened and patriotic seized the opportunity to remind their countrymen of their lost rights, and united the attempt of national regeneration with that of the national defence. The appeal was responded to, with enthusiasm, constancy, and courage.—England powerfully assisted,—and for six years, almost every part of the country beyond the range of French cannon, was governed by Elective or Representative Assemblies.

1814.

Ferdinand, released from captivity, returned to Madrid in 1814. The events of the war had caused immense inroads on the power, moral and material, of the Clerical Orders. Their influence

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* Precisely the same plea urged at this hour in England, to check the diffusion of Education.

however was as yet in the ascendant with those in whom the executive authority rested. Instead of recommending or acquiescing in useful practical modifications of what had been done during the King's absence, they instigated and enabled him* to abolish the Cortes, and re-establish Despotism.

But the intelligence of the country had been awakened, the recollection of popular institutions had been too extensively diffused, too practically and vividly revived to render contentment and their extinction, any longer compatible :—and

1820.

In 1820 the liberal party, though deprived of many of its leaders,— without any foreign assistance,—compelled the King and Priesthood to submit to the restoration of the Democratic Constitution of 1812. But a single legislative chamber as the chief depository of power, was not calculated to fulfil a stable settlement; and in the same mountains which have now been again the focus of rebellion, numerous and formidable armed bands soon appeared in insurrection, under the designation of the "*Army of the Faith.*"

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* "They (the clergy) are the authors and advisers of the measures of the day."—*Duke of Wellington, 20th Oct.* 1814.

1823.

But they were effectually restrained, and the Representative system remained in full force till 1823—when it was put down, not by the *Bands of the Faith,*—not by the Spanish people,—but by the aid of a French army of intervention of 100,000 men, backed by the cabinets of the North.

The monks, absolutists, and inquisitionists were thus reinstated in the plenitude of their functions. Austrian armies of intervention carried into execution a similar policy in regard to Piedmont and Naples, which (having caught the contagion of liberty and proclaimed the Spanish Constitution) were thus also forced back into slavery by foreign bayonets. Don Miguel performed at a subsequent period the same task by the Constitution of Portugal—with the indirect assistance (to our shame be it said) of a British force.

1823 *to* 1830.

Supported by the French army which for five years retained possession of the Spanish fortresses, the successful party were enabled to wreak their vengeance on the Constitutionalists.—Exile, dungeons, the gallies, or the scaffold, awaited, with few exceptions, all who were of the least note on the side of reform. Forty thousand families

are stated to have fled. The regular troops had partly sympathised with the Liberals. The whole body of the officers were subjected to an examination before what was styled a "*Junta of Purification.*" All of questionable political opinions were removed and replaced by those from the "Army of the Faith," or by persons of any sort deemed orthodox.

Thus the army, imperfectly constituted and utterly neglected before, became in a yet greater degree degraded and reduced to about 45,000 men.

This, in so extensive a country, requiring so many garrisons, left, it is obvious, an exceedingly small force disposable for active operation.—Besides which a practice then existed of allowing the absence of a large part of the regular troops on furlough. These circumstances, aggravated by financial difficulties, are alone sufficient to account for the feebleness of the Government on the breaking out of the present rebellion.

Ferdinand, who had more sagacity than was attributed to him in this country, began to see the expediency of moderation, evinced tendencies to administrative correction, and even permitted taxes to be levied on some of the immense property of the church. Improvements had even com-

menced in education and industry. — The Apostolical party no longer deemed the king sufficiently despotic.

Don Carlos, then presumptive heir to the throne, was adopted as their leader.—A numerous body, under the designation of "*Royalist Volunteers*," amounting to nearly 300,000 men, were enrolled by the partizans of absolutism throughout the kingdom, divided into battalions, squadrons, &c. and to some extent disciplined,—ostensibly to guard the "throne and altar against any new attempts of the liberals or infidels,"—but, in the result,—to secure the succession of *Don Carlos*, or even the removal, if found practicable, of Ferdinand, in his favour. As many as 120,000 were armed.*

Accordingly, several conspiracies, and in one instance, an insurrection, took place with the latter object,—particularly in 1827, in which 30,000 persons were engaged. In these Don Carlos was pub-

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* In 1832 this force was stated to consist of 500 Battalions of Infantry, 51 Squadrons of Horse, 24 Companies of Artillery.—Those of Biscay alone, independent of Navarre, had enrolled 14,658.—See the Madrid Almanac or "Guia de Forasteros," of 1833.—Originally this enrolment was imprudently sanctioned by Government, and therefore recognized in official documents.

licly known to have been implicated. But extreme affection or indulgence for his brother was a trait of Ferdinand's character. On the successive detection of these plots, he invariably quashed the judicial inquiries when they appeared likely to expose Carlos to criminal inculpation. The subordinate persons, who from time to time put themselves forward, were punished. But the government was not strong enough effectually to discountenance a force, prepared with such professed laudable objects as were the "Voluntarios Realistas."—Strong as is our own government, it was found no easy matter to effect the discontinuance of the Orange Yeomanry and Orange or Brunswick Lodges,—associations of the English High Church Party not dissimilar to those alluded to. Happily however for the peace of England, though having also an Heir Presumptive, we have had no colourable ground for a disputed succession.

The chief strength of these Carlist corps was in the Basque provinces.

1830 *to* 1833.

But the overthrow of CHARLES THE TENTH of France;—of the TORY MINISTRY in England;—the disastrous condition of DON MIGUEL in Portugal, whose usurpation was so analogous with that contemplated for Spain;—the increasing influence and

attractive character of the QUEEN CHRISTINA,—the birth of her daughter ISABELLA,—the confirmation of her right to the Succession by the Grandees and Deputies assembled in Cortes for that purpose by the late King—greatly discouraged and paralysed the plans of the CARLISTS.

Death of Ferdinand, 29th Sept. 1833.

The expected death of FERDINAND at length took place. The INFANT QUEEN ISABELLA, then only three years of age, was proclaimed with rejoicings in all the great towns,—congratulatory addresses were transmitted from various parts of the kingdom.

The ministers of Ferdinand (at the head of whom was ZEA BERMUDEZ) were continued in their offices by the QUEEN MOTHER, now regent,—by whom, on the 13th of October, a Manifesto was published, declaring that no alteration—"no dangerous innovation"—should take place in the policy of the country.

The Ministry, notwithstanding all the preparations of the Carlists, never contemplated a civil war; hoping, it would seem, to avert this loudly threatened contingency,—by preserving the forms of despotism for the satisfaction of the absolutists—while extend-

ing to the reformers clemency, personal favour and partial amelioration.

FRANCE and ENGLAND at once cordially acknowledged the Queen. But this propitious commencement was soon interrupted. The representatives of RUSSIA, PRUSSIA, and AUSTRIA refused their recognition and retired from the Court, giving all the encouragement in their power to the malcontents. The agents of the PAPAL and other minor states followed the example.

Rebellion commenced, 6th Oct. 1833.

And on the 6th of October, but four days after the news of the King's death, the standard of rebellion was raised by Santos Ladron in Navarre, and Merino* in Castile. On the 9th, Don Carlos was proclaimed in Vitoria and Bilbao, the provincial capitals of Biscay and Alava. The monks were conspicuously active on both these occasions.

"To preserve unimpaired the pure faith and the ancient customs of the country"—(*Conservar in-*

* The Priest Merino was formerly distinguished as a guerilla Chief against the French, and was noted for courage, address, and cruelty. Santos Ladron had been previously at the head of the Bands of the "*Faith*" in Navarre before 1823.

tactos la fé y las costumbres antiguas de la nation), were the assigned reasons—*Religion* and *Don Carlos* the watchwords of the movement. The distinct topic of the Basque privileges (without which the rebellion would have long since terminated), was an after consideration.

Within ten days the insurrection had spread throughout a large part of Biscay, Navarre, Old Castile, Lower Arragon, Valencia, and Catalonia.

No country of similar extent in Europe is so intersected by chains and groups of mountains, as Spain. It is the inhabitants of such regions who are usually the last to yield to any great changes in religion, allegiance, prejudice, or government. The Highlanders of Scotland adhered to the Stuarts, as those of Spain to Carlos, long after those for whom they contended were repudiated by the great majority of their countrymen. So also the remote and ignorant Vendeans (isolated by their woods and swamps) to the elder Bourbons.

The Basques, the chief supporters of the Spanish Pretender, are a brave, hardy, and obstinate race. Of this, their resistance to the Romans, the Moors, and latterly the French, are undoubted proofs. For a defensive, protracted, systematic

contest, within their own fastnesses, these mountaineers have, in the present day, no equals. —Addicted to smuggling, fond of the life of a guerilla, in which many of them were already veterans,—they are in other respects ignorant, cruel, fanatical, and incredibly subservient to their priests; but this latter tendency is now fast diminishing.—In strength, activity, and endurance, no peasantry in Europe surpass them. The Carlist Catalans, and those under Cabrera, partake, though in a lesser degree, of these characteristics,—but in fanaticism, they quite equal the Basques. In their early organization in the present instance, they derived great additional assistance from the numerous desertions at the commencement of the war, and the many hundred disaffected officers and non-commissioned officers sent away from the army in the latter years of the King's reign.

In the provinces referred to, their progress was most rapid. They blockaded PAMPLONA and SAN SEBASTIAN, possessed themselves of VITORIA, BILBAO, Tolosa, Hernani, Miranda, and various other important places. Seventeen of the so-called "Royalist," or *Carlist* battalions were assembling at different points of Biscay and Navarre. Merino was at the head of from 15 to 20,000 of the same force, covering a great part of Old Castile. In Valencia and Lower Arragon 23 or 24 battalions were

collecting under different chiefs, including 3000 who assembled at Morella; affairs in Catalonia wore a similar aspect; and throughout the whole extent of the country between the WESTERN SEA, the PYRENEES and GUADARRAMA—*Pamplona, San Sebastian,* and *Burgos* were, for several weeks, the sole remaining posts in possession of the Government.

To combat this formidable rising, the means at hand were as follows:—In the north but two regiments, one in San Sebastian, the other in Pamplona,—one in Old Castile, two in Valencia, five in the fortresses of Catalonia, with a small force in the Capital. The only other available troops consisted of some battalions in Galicia under MORILLO, and about 10,000 men under RODIL and SARSFIELD, guarding the frontiers on the side of Portugal, from whence an invasion by Don Carlos with many of his adherents, and supported by Don Miguel, was apprehended.

Thus, with a disputed succession;—an empty, and what is worse, a discredited Treasury;—pre-organized rebellion; and a military force, numerically (and still more morally) utterly inadequate—it must be admitted the circumstances surrounding at its outset the Queen Regent's administration, were sufficiently perilous.

The corps of Rodil could not be withdrawn;—that of Sarsfield, with such reinforcements as could be collected, were ordered to assemble at Burgos and move from thence on Biscay. The local authorities in other parts of the kingdom, proceeded, wherever it was yet possible, to disarm the Carlist Volunteers, lest they should imitate their comrades of the north.—After some weeks, Sarsfield advanced from Burgos, recovered Miranda, Vitoria, and Bilbao, and gained considerable successes,—as did also Lauder in Catalonia. But the delay which had taken place, unfortunately exposed the former to suspicion, and on the day following his recapture of Bilbao,—he was removed from the command.

Several important places were however restored to the Queen's authority. Her forces in the disturbed provinces were increased, but so also were those of the enemy.

For four months the civil war continued with alternate but partial results; when in February, 1834, Lauder, who held the appointment of Captain General in Catalonia, and had acquired influence,—published a representation to the Queen, vehemently denouncing the policy of the Ministers, their failure in subduing the insurrection, and

finally proclaiming the *imperative necessity of consulting the nation and assembling a Cortes.*

This appeal, coming from an officer high in authority, couched in bold and patriotic language, backed by the public spirited population of Barcelona, speaking in fact, the sentiments though hitherto suppressed, of the most influential of almost every class, was irresistible.—The Ministry fell.

The necessity of a more defined system of policy, of frankly identifying the cause of the young Queen with that of a great national party, and so, of deriving support from it—became apparent;—and the Regent called to the Presidency of the Council MARTINEZ DE LA ROSA, a man of distinguished talent, integrity, and moderate liberal opinions.

Estatuto Real proclaimed, 4th of April, 1834.

The fruit of this most desired change, both of Ministry and System, was the publication on the 4th of April of the *Royal Statute,*—granting, in fact, a CONSTITUTION, with Chambers of Peers and Deputies, —and which, (though the initiative was yet reserved to the Crown, and the franchise and other popular rights were altogether too restricted), was, for the

time, a well-judged and admirable step in the great progress of Reform.

This was immediately followed by a general amnesty, bringing back to their country numbers of liberals exiled in the former reign, and restoring to political life the distinguished chiefs of the party—Calatrava, Arguelles, Alava, Mendizabel, Valdez, Mina, San Miguel, Quiroga, Galiano, Isturiz, &c. &c. men whose sufferings for the public cause enhanced their well-merited reputation and invested them with a great moral influence.—The consequences were increased stability to the Ministry, joy and sanguine hopes to the greater part of the kingdom.

But new institutions, however well adapted to the future, do not supply immediate wants, more especially those of the Exchequer; — the reinforcement of 25,000 recruits ordered to belevied was therefore but slowly accomplished. Other events requiring notice, occurred about this period.

The Spanish Government, brought by the recent changes more completely into harmony with that of England,—now sought assistance from the latter, and in the first instance, for an Agreement or Convention, sanctioning the entry of the Spanish *Corps of Observation* into Portugal,—to co-operate with Don Pedro, against the two Pretenders.

This afforded an opportunity for the attainment of a greater object—and the English Government said—"*We will embrace the occasion which this Con-* "*vention affords us to join the four great powers of* "*the West of Europe, namely, France, England,* "*Spain and Portugal, in one alliance—we will unite* "*them for the attainment of one common and general* "*object.*"*

29th May, 1834.

The immediate consequences were perfectly satisfactory. The Spanish troops co-operated with the Portuguese. The two Pretenders were surrounded. Miguel surrendered, and was permitted to retire on a pension to Italy. His army of 12,000 men laid down their arms. And Portugal,—so many years a prey to violent distractions,—was thus by the establishment of a constitutional throne, restored to tranquillity.

Similar results to Spain might perhaps have ensued, had not the generous interference of the British mission, saved Don Carlos from falling into the hands of the Queen's troops.

He was conveyed to England in a British man-

* For the views of the English Government on this head,—the reader is referred to the masterly and unanswered Speech of Viscount Palmerston, of the 19th April, 1837.

of-war. Regardless of the obligations thus incurred, he passed from this country in disguise, eluded the French police, and on the 10th July, 1834, arrived in Navarre.

Zumalacarregui, elected at an early period to the chief command of the Basques, was now confirmed by the pretender in that appointment, with the rank of Lieutenant-General.

This officer, a native of Guipuscoa—originally a Captain of Guerillas, under Jauregui,—subsequently Colonel of a regular Regiment,—was of a severe character, and had already begun the system of terror, which, followed by his successors, has not a little contributed to retain in submission, both the troops and inhabitants of the revolted districts.

The prompt, reckless, and cruel punishments inflicted by these Chiefs, on the slightest suspicion of disaffection or disobedience, on the part of any class, age, or sex,—had the effect of causing the almost immediate flight of all who were opposed to their views.—which (even in these districts) included nearly four-fifths of the proprietors; the result being no inconsiderable cause of the protraction of the contest,—the numerous small farmers and tenantry finding in the absence of their Christino landlords a release from the payment of rent, with the promise in the event of the success of the Pretender, of the final possession of their holdings.

These particulars will also account for the extraordinary difficulty in obtaining intelligence of the movements of the Rebels.—Rewards could rarely do it—terror and fanaticism had destroyed the effect of money.

The Corps of Rodil, now no longer required in Portugal, joined the army of the North. But this was counterbalanced by the increased strength and organization of the Carlists, and by the enthusiasm created by the presence of the Pretender, —before whom, Zumalacarregui passed in review in the month of August, a corps of 16,000 men, independent of the troops in Biscay.

At this period, a considerable portion of the Queen's forces was disseminated in open, unconnected, or feebly fortified posts, along the principal lines of communication. While the enemy, secure in the support of the population, as yet confined themselves to the strong holds of their mountains, —descending occasionally to execute sudden attacks against detached corps, &c.

Towards the spring however of 1835, they took the offensive, and their operations assumed a decisive character.

The ill success of the Queen's Generals raised a storm of contumely against them at Madrid. One of the inconvenient consequences, was, that during the first year and a half of the war, the Go-

vernment were obliged to change the Generals-in-Chief, every three months on an average.

April to June, 1835.

From the beginning of April of this year, the advantages gained by the Rebels were of rapid succession. In the Amescoas, the whole army was thrown into confusion, with the loss of 2000 men. Then took place the defeat of Oraa in the Bastan. A council of generals was now held at Pamplona, which declared the necessity of French intervention—and transmitted this opinion to Government.

Lord Elliot's Mission from the short Tory administration, arrived about this period on the scene of action. The declared object of this mission was to put an end to the Massacre of Prisoners, by a convention between the Belligerents. Such an object could not but be applauded.

The success of this arrangement undoubtedly diminished, in the first instance, the effusion of blood, but its political effects to the interests of the Queen, were deeply injurious. Accredited to both the contending parties, the mission was represented and considered by the Carlists, as a species of recognition by the English Government. In the negotiation, the Rebel chief was placed on a level with the Commander of the Royal troops.—The free

corps and national guards of the Queen, were, with obvious unfairness, excluded from the protection of the convention!—The members of the mission were reported (incorrectly it must be presumed) to entertain a warm interest for the Pretender, and to have expressed most favourable opinions of the superiority of his troops, with in fact the conviction, that they had no more to do towards the overthrow of the constitution, than to march on Madrid. The bias of the Cabinet was inferred from this supposed inclination (erroneously interpreted or not) of its mission.

On the other hand, the illustrious person then at the head of the Foreign department, had strictly observed the Quadruple Treaty, by supplying to the Queen's armies 60,000 stand of arms, by fitting out, arming and equipping in our dock-yards, a Spanish war steamer, &c.

But the triumphant progress of Zumalacarregui was unabated.—The disasters of Guernica, Alegria, Viana, and several others, succeeded at intervals of only a few days, in each of which divisions of the Royal Army were surprised, overpowered or routed;—then followed the sieges or capture of Trevino, Salvatierra, Elisondo, Orduna, Durango, Irun, Hernani, Tolosa, Bergara, Estella, Fontarabia, &c. A considerable number of cannon fell into the hands of the Rebels; the effective loss to

the Queen's army could not have been less than 12,000 men,—and in the first week of June, BILBAO was besieged.

These events attracted the attention of all Europe. The hopes of bigotry and despotism were every where raised to the highest pitch.—And from that period pecuniary aid flowed in to the Pretender from various quarters.—The Royal troops were panic-stricken by this series of reverses,—the aspect of the Queen's cause was most gloomy and discouraging!

On the 7th of this month (June), MARTINEZ DE LA ROSA, discredited by these reverses, was removed from the *Presidency of the Council*, and replaced by TORENO, who had been a member of the previous Cabinet.

In this extremity, the Ambassador of Spain at our Court, General Don Miguel D'Alava, whose high estimation and distinguished service with the English army are so well known,—applied to the British Government, for permission to raise in England, an auxiliary corps of 10,000 men for the service of the Queen.*

* See the TORY NEWSPAPERS of that date—for instance. —"It is quite clear that some meanness, some paltry evasion "is about to be practised; but unless the Bill (Suspension

This, being in the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty, was immediately granted—(the law having expressly provided for such a contingency). —And in the KING'S ORDER IN COUNCIL, of the 10th June, 1835, carrying the same into effect,—the desire of His Majesty was expressed, that his subjects should embark in the enterprise.—Cannon, arms, ammunition and equipments, were also to be provided from the British Arsenals.

Such were the circumstances under which the writer of the present memoranda was honoured, by the offer of the chief command of this corps. And though not unconscious of some of the formidable difficulties likely to arise—yet warmly sympathizing in the cause it was intended to assist, and having a strong inclination for the field duties of his profession,—he, after a day or two's consideration, consented to undertake the responsibility proposed to him.

" of the Foreign Enlistment Act) by which it is to be effected, " be carried through both Houses at a Rail-road pace, we think " it is not improbable that Don Carlos will be quietly settled at " Madrid before it can be acted upon."—Again—"*Zumalacarre-* " *gui's* forces now augmented and consolidated, the people flock- " ing by thousands to the Royal Standard, and the King abso- " lutely idolized in the country, present appearances so formi- " dable that neither ten nor 20,000 men will make the slightest " impression."

A principal consideration towards the realization of the measure, was of course, that concerning the material means of paying and subsisting the force,—for it is well known, that without some regularity and adequacy in those respects, of all troops in the world, the most unsatisfactory and difficult to manage or maintain in a state of efficiency, are the English,—and this, even when serving under their own Government, completely officered, and previously organized. But the question in this case, as in so many others, was one of degree; for privation, and obstacles must be counted on in war;—and the assurances given, and earnest determination expressed by the Spanish Government of making due provision on those points, were satisfactory;—an extract of a despatch relating to which being subjoined.* It is

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* "Nevertheless, an idea of the utmost importance, and suggested by the practical experience of the British army, I acquired during the war of Independence occurs to me. Accustomed as this army is to the most exact fulfilment of the conditions existing between itself and its Government, and to the most rigorous punctuality in the settlement of its pay and allowances, it becomes requisite to a degree perfectly unknown in our armies, and without making the slightest difference between the circumstances of peace or war, that the privileges to which they are entitled should be religiously fulfilled. Therefore, from the particular circumstances in which Spain is placed, and from the defects of our administration in order to avoid any delays or discussion, I am of opinion that it is

from the *Duke of Ahumada*, then Minister of War, a general officer whose highly honourable character afforded every ground of reliance.

Another consideration however, quite as important, was that of the means of officering the proposed levy. The number required would be considerable, nearly 500. But after a twenty years' peace, and

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" indispensably necessary that the auxiliary corps in question " should come out provided with a commissariat in ratio to its " strength, in order to relieve the Spanish Government from " every other obligation than that of providing the necessary " funds for carrying these arrangements into immediate effect." Again—" In conclusion, although what I am about to observe " may be considered foreign to the attributes of the Minister of " War, I nevertheless deem it of the utmost importance to state, " that before receiving into the service of her Majesty this " auxiliary force, it is indispensable that the funds requisite for " their subsistence in every respect, should be provided for. " For, as I have already expressed myself, it is not to be expected " that this force will either suffer or tolerate the slightest want " of punctuality in the payment of their pay and allowances, " based upon the scale of those in force in their own armies; " neither can we expect in this respect any consideration on " their part,—therefore, this corps, far from being useful to the " cause of her Majesty, would, on the contrary, prove highly " prejudicial, should the conditions under which they have en- " tered the service be in the slightest degree infringed.

" *Madrid, 25th June*, 1835." " THE DUKE OF AHUMADA."

The assurances of the President of the Council, the Ambassador at this Court, and the Minister of Finance then in London, were to the same effect.

there being some 13 or 14,000 officers on the lists of the British establishment, it was calculated, that, whether from a desire of enterprise, experience, or distinction—a sufficient portion of the above number would have been disposed to avail themselves of this opportunity. But within a few days after the announcement of the Order in Council, an opinion gained circulation that certain high military personages were decidedly adverse to the measure. This had the instantaneous effect of deterring great numbers of officers from engaging in the corps.—On previous as well as subsequent occasions, when it has been determined to grant assistance to the army of an ally, not only permission but encouragements have been extended to the officers engaged in carrying out such objects. The contrary was now adopted:*—and to such an extent—that it remained to be proved, how

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* Accordingly, but ten officers of the effective army (including one of engineers and one of artillery) joined the Legion. Of these—*seven* retired at different intervals, *two* were killed, and only *one* (a Lieutenant) remained in Spain till the expiration of the two years' service. From the non-effective or retired lists we had a similar proportion.—Six officers of the East India Company's army gave us their assistance so long as their respective leaves of absence would permit. To these should be added about forty, who had been in the Greek, Columbian, or Portuguese service, and an equal number of serjeants promoted to commissions.—The greater part therefore having never before been in any military occupation.

far it may be possible, under these circumstances, to carry the measure into effect.

Zumalacarregui, wounded in the knee, while directing the operations against Bilbao, died on the 25th June.—The siege continued.

From about the same period, may be dated the DURANGO DECREE. By this document was announced the intention of the Pretender to put to death all foreigners interfering in the contest who should fall into the hands of his troops,—and this, though he had himself many foreign officers of different nations in his ranks.* The Bishop of Leon and the Duchess of Beira, the Pretender's most influential advisers, were then in London and in intimate communication with the English Carlists. The primary object of this declaration of "no quarter," was to check the recruiting of men and officers for the auxiliary corps. It also furnished a convenient weapon of attack against the policy of the English Ministry. Many were incredulous that so flagitious a barbarity would be carried into execution. They had yet to learn that a party claiming to be the most loyal, pious, and christian amongst us, could be capable of palliating, justifying, essentially encouraging the cold-blooded assassination of their countrymen!

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* English, French, Prussian, Austrian, Italian, Portuguese, &c.

By the first week of July 1835, the Queen's Generals were enabled to collect a sufficient force, with which to raise the siege of Bilbao. But such was their paucity of means, that the English squadron were obliged to lend a chief part of the rations required for this most urgent operation.

In this first siege of Bilbao, the Carlists had 18 pieces of heavy artillery and 25 battalions. In order to incite the troops, it was publicly given out that the town would be given up to pillage and slaughter. And 20,000 Carlist peasants are said to have been in readiness to assist. The garrison consisted of 4000 men, including a battalion of National guards, composed of the better class of citizens, and were commanded by a very brave and active officer, the Conde de Mirasol.* The English squadron was not at that time permitted to interfere, beyond maintaining the communications between the town and relieving army, a service however of great utility.

The Carlists retired to Navarre, and laid siege to Puente la Reyna. They were followed by General Cordova, now invested with the command in chief. The siege of Puente was raised, the enemy were defeated at *Mendigorria*,

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* A small party of *English Marine Auxiliaries* rendered gallant assistance in the defence of the breach.

and driven across the Arga with the loss of 700 men.—This action had no decisive result, but it was the first considerable success gained by the Queen's arms, and tending to relieve the troops from discouragement, was important.

On the death of Zumalacarregui, the direction of the general operations of the Pretender's forces, devolved, with the title of Chief of the Staff, on *Moreno*, whose atrocious conduct to Torrijos and Boyd some years previously, rather recommended him than otherwise on the present occasion. *Maroto* a Castillian, and *Segastibelsa* a Guipuscoan, then commanded divisions.

The Spanish Government, still pressed by scantiness of means for carrying on the contest, and looking to the political effect of the presence of an English force, however immature,—already urged the arrival of the Commander of the Legion, with such portion of the levy as may have been raised: and, complying with these instances, he embarked in the first week of August for Spain, the recruits proceeding at the same time by detachments, with as much celerity as possible.*

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* "Convinced as I am," (said the President of the Council, Toreno), "of the urgent necessity of reinforcing the army of "operations, before the disasters of war render our position far "worse and demoralize the soldier."

Here, one of the most important results of the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act, may be noticed — that of the desire it immediately created in the French Ministry of that period, to have a similar share with us, in the assistance to be rendered to Spain by this measure. Accordingly, very soon after the announcement of the intention to form a British Auxiliary Corps, it was intimated to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, the Duke de Frias, that if a like request were made to the King of the French, it would be acceded to.

The result of this intimation was the permission to raise a French force, under the name of the "*Volunteers of Paris,*" the enlistment for which was encouraged by the King;—and the transference of a corps styled the "*Foreign Legion,*" from the French service to that of Spain. This corps had been embodied four years previously; was commanded by Major-General Bernelle, an experienced officer of the imperial army: had already undergone arduous service in Algiers; and was in the highest state of discipline and efficiency. The officers were French, the men French, Poles, and Alsatians. The Foreign Legion disembarked at Tarragona from Algiers on the 19th August, and marching through Arragon, eventually joined the army of the North at Pamplona.*—The Volun-

* "Extract of a memorial sent from Pamplona, upon the state

teers of Paris arrived at Jaca on the 18th of September under Colonel Suarce. These two corps were estimated at 7,600 men.

The Portuguese Government, now easily induced to follow the example of England and France, contributed 6000 infantry and 750 cavalry, selected from the best Portuguese regiments, the elite of that army, and commanded by one of their best officers, the Baron dos Antes. This force (which possessed the advantage of being paid, clothed, and rationed, by its own Government) entered the province of Valladolid on the 23rd October.* But the Portuguese were not permitted to come into the actual theatre of operations till a much later period, having been enjoined to remain in reserve, on such points as might be agreed on.

Thus, in fact—to the British *order in Council* of

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of the French auxiliary Legion"—received from the Spanish Embassy, viz:—

"The total augmentation to the Legion, from the time of its disembarkation, was 169 officers and 2113 soldiers,—so that the maximum force to which the said Legion amounted, was 298 officers and 6134 soldiers:"—which, adding 1200 for the two battalions of Parisian Volunteers, makes the total French force 7632.

* A battalion of 800 foreigners, who had served under Don Pedro, was also collected at Lisbon, and brought round to Barcelona.

1835, is to be traced an augmentation of the Queen's army by the end of that year, of from 18 to 20,000 men,*—the importance of which will be best appreciated, by looking back to the critical situation of the contest at that time.

It is difficult to suppose the existence of a town more unfavourably situated for defence than Bilbao. In the bottom of an amphitheatre, fearfully dominated by surrounding eminences, its environs afford a variety of strong positions upon which a besieging army may cover its operations. Towards the end of August, 1835, it was again invested by twelve Carlist battalions, preparatory to a siege. They gained possession of the detached outworks; were entrenching themselves, and had cut the communications with the sea, by a bridge and booms thrown across the river.

It was necessary to break the investment before the enemy should have time to become more firmly established.

With this object, on the 6th September, about

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* The *Volunteers of Paris* (two battalions), and the *British Legion*, were the only portion of this force newly raised, and requiring time for organization. The Parisian Volunteers existed however for little more than a month. They entered Spain in September, and were disbanded, by mutual consent, in October. Insufficient supplies and want of pay, were the assigned causes.

3000 of the Auxiliary recruits disembarked at Portugalette,* six miles from Bilbao, while a corps of 8000 Spaniards co-operated from the side of the Ebro, under General Espaletta. On the following morning the enemy abandoned their positions, destroying their bridge, &c. and the relieving columns entered the town without resistance.

On the 11th September, Espaletta's division commenced its march by the Orduna road to rejoin the army of the Ebro, from which it had been detached. The column had proceeded only a few miles, when the main body of the Pretender's army, more than double Espaletta's force, were discovered in position on the mountains over which he had to pass. He had no option but to retire. Pursued with vivacity, and pressed in a defile by superior numbers, his troops fell into disorder, and were driven into the town with a loss of 800 men. The enemy passed the Nervion river by the Puente Nueva, and threatened a general attack. The English Auxiliaries, whose assistance had been previously offered and

* From San Sebastian and Santander. The embarkation from the former place commenced on the 28th August. On the 29th the remaining part of the force made an advance or reconnoissance, in the direction of Hernani, as a preparative for the possible encounter near Bilbao. Four men of the Legion were killed, and a great victory was celebrated for the Carlists by their English friends.

declined,* having remained therefore in reserve, now advanced in column along the main road, forcing the enemy to recross the river as rapidly as they had come on. Thus the action terminated. And in two or three days, Espaletta resumed his march by a more secure line.

The Auxiliaries continued for some weeks at Bilbao; received there the recruits as they successively arrived from England, and were at the same time enabled to cover the construction of various detached works for the future defence of the place.

It was however soon determined to remove them from the coast to the interior. Accordingly, so soon as the additional defences of Bilbao were in sufficient forwardness, positive orders arrived for their march to cantonments in the district of Briviesca, there to complete their organization.

This however was to be regretted, as the line of the coast was best adapted for the corps, and where it might have rendered most service. The enemy accordingly, profiting by its removal, gained in that quarter during the ensuing winter, serious advan-

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* Until after this period, General Evans held no recognised place or command in the Spanish army, his commission not having been yet gazetted, and his name consequently not having appeared in general orders. This was soon rectified.

tages—amongst others, the capture of Valmaceda, Plencia, and Lequitio, with 700 prisoners, and 30 pieces of cannon,—to which may be added, the bombardment of San Sebastian. This fortress had been inadvertently left with a garrison of only a few hundred militia. The Carlist General *Segastibelsa*, established himself (Dec. 1835), with 4000 men and some heavy mortars, within 600 yards of the glacis. There were many Carlists in the town, and great fears were entertained, lest by treachery or surprise it might fall into the enemy's hands. This was averted by 500 of the Auxiliaries, and some cannon from the English squadron, promptly despatched by sea from Santander.

In the mean time, the ministry of TORENO had fallen into greater disrepute than that of his predecessor. As the executive became weak, the popular party acquired strength. The latter alleged that no progress was made in subduing the rebellion, advancing practical reform, or consolidating the constitution;—and that the desire of French intervention, was not so much for the expulsion of the Pretender, as for restraining the progress of liberty.

Actuated by these opinions—Cadiz, Seville, Jaen, Granada, Malaga, Valencia, Barcelona, Zaragossa, and other important towns, proclaimed resistance to the Ministry, renounced its authority, and established juntas or assemblies for their local and in-

dependent government. A body of volunteers were even in arms in Andalusia, under an exaltado member of the Legislature, with the avowed object of marching on Madrid to eject the Cabinet.

The leading demands of the Juntas were a new electoral law,—appointment of more liberal functionaries,—liberty of the press,—transfer of ecclesiastical property to the state,—extinction of tithes. At length 408 monasteries were suppressed by a decree of the Government. But this concession came too late. The populace rose in many of the towns, and put considerable numbers of monks and friars to death, or compelled them to fly. Some of the governors of provinces shared a similar fate. Even Madrid was in commotion, and declared to be in a state of siege. The army, fully occupied by the rebels, could render no assistance. Still the Ministry fulminated threatening denunciations against the Juntas, but had no means whatever of carrying them into effect. Thus, while a part of the nation were contending in arms for despotism, another were in revolt for democracy. The kingdom verged on anarchy. The Government virtually had no existence beyond the precincts of the capital.

In these confusions, the partizans of the Pretender and his principles, foreign and domestic, experienced of course the utmost encouragement.

On the 14th September, 1835, the TORENO Cabinet tendered their resignations. The task of the Queen Regent in selecting those to replace them, who might allay the storm, and restore to order so many discordant elements, was one of no ordinary difficulty.

The PRESIDENCY of the COUNCIL having been declined by GENERAL ALAVA, devolved on Senor MENDIZABAL, then returning to Madrid through Portugal, where he had recently rendered conspicuous services to Constitutional Government, and the reputation of which now strongly recommended him to public confidence.

More vigorous efforts for putting down the rebellion,* a more progressive policy, and measures generally more consonant with the prevalent opinion, being announced by the new Ministry,—the provinces were almost immediately tranquillized, dissolved their Juntas, and tendered their submission to Government: a result evincing more sound feeling and moderation than is usually observable in revolutionary movements. But the credit and

* In October (1835) a decree was published for the levy of 100,000 men, with which to reinforce the army. It was accompanied by the power of purchasing exemption in certain cases. In about six or eight months from 60 to 70,000 men were realised, but they were very young, and of small stature.

resources of the country suffered a severe shock, the effects of which were soon felt by the army, and especially by that part of it, whose incipient formation least qualified it to contend with privation.

The utmost anxiety having been evinced that the Legion should take its place in the line of operations, it was moved forward in *December*, and occupied Vitoria and the neighbouring villages on the banks of the Zadorra. Although the period (not exceeding an average of about ten weeks,) during which this force had been actually under arms,* was of course far too limited to fit it for the field; still both men and officers were admitted to have made great progress in their instruction, and were animated by an excellent spirit. But whatever may have been their zeal or desire of action, the operations for the five following months, were not such as to give useful developement to those qualities.

This period was in fact occupied in establishing a general system of blockade, to be maintained by a semi-circular line of about sixty fortified posts, on an extension of 150 miles, running along the Incartaciones, the upper Ebro and Arga,—the flanks

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* The English law in no case permits levies for a foreign power, being drilled or exercised, within the British territory. Those raised, therefore, for this service, arrived in Spain precisely in the state in which they were enlisted.

resting on Pamplona and Bilbao.—Vitoria in front of the centre, and San Sebastian remaining isolated. To reduce the enemy by restricting their supplies was the object of this blockade; but there were no adequate means of closing the most important part of the circumference—the French frontier, through which the rebels now received all the resources their own territory did not provide.*

It was at this interval, that severe losses were sustained by the Auxiliaries in hospital. Paramount exigency required their premature employment in the field, and their original physical composition, as well as other circumstances but ill qualified them to endure with so brief a preparation, the hardships, privations, and harassing out-post service before a vigilant enemy, of this, the most inclement winter known in that country for many years. There was, however, nothing whatever extraordinary in the matter. But the civilian public

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* The duties of the troops consisted in fortifying various small towns rescued from the enemy, and in protecting the extended series of posts in course of being established on the line of blockade. The only affair with the enemy worthy of any note, was that of Arlaban, on the 16th of January, 1836, in which the part assigned to the Legion was executed without loss or failure. There was no truth whatever in the statement that the army lost artillery, baggage, or prisoners.

were taught to believe that disease had never before committed havoc among young troops,* and that such a misfortune in the present instance could alone be attributable to something inherently bad in the Spanish cause, the Whig Ministry, or the Member for Westminster!—And they who had been un-

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* From the compilation of Col. Gurwood, hundreds of passages may be cited, on the inefficiency and liability to sickness of young troops, even of the highest qualities and the best commanded;—take for instance.—"Not only the new soldiers "can perform no service, but by filling up the hospitals, they "are a burthen to us."—"I consider Lord Aylmer's Brigade and "all other men immediately from England, to be *quite unfit for* "*service.*"—"The 2000 veterans he will take away are of more "use than the 6000 he proposes to send."—"Experience has "taught me that they (the old soldiers) cannot be replaced "by three times their numbers."—"The army is starving, no "magazine of any kind is formed, and as far as that goes, we "are just where we were in October last."—"The soldiers are "worn down by want and privations of every description. And "*all this though provided with money to pay for every thing that* "*could be got.*"—"Lord Wellington retained his army at Ba- "dajoz, notwithstanding a most alarming *sickness and mortality,* "produced by exhalations from the swampy banks of the "Guadiana acting on the enfeebled bodies of the soldiers, which "broke out immediately on their arrival, and continued to rage "with unabated violence during the months of September and "October."—*General Sir J. Jones.*

By the official returns, it appears that in the last thirty months' service of the veteran Peninsular Army, the enormous number of 346,108 men were treated in the hospitals.

ceasing in their efforts to disorganize, who had never lost an opportunity of defaming, who had used or instigated against the Legion every species of invective, ridicule or slander,—who, by their political power effectually prevented the Ministers from putting a stop to the barbarities of the Durango Decree — were now penetrated with the deepest commiseration for the objects of their previous hostility, and have hardly yet ceased expressing their sympathy or indignation on the subject!— The sincerity of all which may be easily appreciated.

As the rigours of winter diminished, the health of the troops improved, the financial difficulties of the Government, and the condition of the army, in reference to clothing and supplies, becoming proportionally ameliorated.

Considering the services of the Legion as comparatively lost at Vitoria, it was now determined to use the utmost efforts for its removal to the coast, with the view of thus obtaining for it a more independent, useful, and effective field of action.

Fortunately, our Ambassador at Madrid, (to whose energetic and influential exertions the Auxiliaries were on various occasions so deeply indebted), had at the same time represented to

the Queen's Government the urgent expediency of employing them for the future, in co-operation with the British squadron. Any obstacles that may have interposed, were thus prevented, and the force moved to Santander thence to embark for San Sebastian.

With reference to the state of the war in the other three districts in which the rebellion had established itself, namely, Catalonia, Lower Arragon, and Old Castile,—in the two former the contest continued, with indecisive results, but throughout on a far inferior scale of importance, with little organisation, and avowedly to restore despotism, there being no local question of *Fueros*. —In Old Castile, however, and the province of Burgos, the royal troops were soon completely successful,—the bands of Merino were destroyed or put down, and that chieftain took refuge in the suite of the Pretender.

The chief legislative enactments of the spring of 1836 were—a new electoral law, extending the franchise; abolition of tithes (the relief from which to agriculture is already so happily apparent);—abolition of the remainder of the convents,* with appro-

* With a few special exceptions.

priation of their buildings, lands, revenues, &c. to the State, the public sale of which was forthwith commenced. This measure was inevitable. The monastic orders, a few years since, so powerful in Spain as well as Portugal, are now (with the exceptions referred to) objects of popular contempt and deep detestation. Their reign in both these kingdoms has closed in blood. Even the zealous support of their numerous English friends of the Conservative party, the subsidies of the congenial Cabinets of the Continent, the misguided valour and fanaticism of the more ignorant of the Spaniards, have not been able to prolong their existence. But the regular and parochial clergy of the country are still held in due and useful respect, and many of them well deserve it. They are henceforth to be supported in proportion to their real spiritual duties, by the State.

And in this respect (the reform of the temporalities of the Church) it does not appear, that the legislative progress of the Constitutionalists of Spain, bears a disadvantageous comparison, (notwithstanding the many taunts so liberally cast upon them), with that of neighbouring nations.

The degree of danger in which San Sebastian was considered to be placed in December, 1835, has been already alluded to. It was then secured from

the risk of a coup-de-main; but the Carlists continued the investment with additional rigour; surrounded it with triple lines of entrenchment, which for five months they laboured in perfecting;—had at length laid platforms for 30 mortars and guns of large calibre, intending to bombard and burn the town; and which, had they been allowed a little more time, they undoubtedly would have done. The long continuance of this state of things, during which a principal fortress so near the French frontier, was exposed to insult, cannon and even musket shot occasionally reaching into the centre of the place, which the principal inhabitants had abandoned—was in itself, in a war of this nature, a most serious political injury to the Queen's Government.

At day-break on the 5th May, 1836, the enemy's lines were attacked by 6000 of the Royal troops, three-fourths being of the British Legion, and the remainder Spaniards. The Carlists were about 4000 strong, under their Commandant-General of Guipuscoa, *Segastibelsa*. Their right rested on the Uromea river, then unfordable—their left on a swamp equally impracticable, from recent heavy rains. The same cause rendered the ascent of the heights additionally difficult to our troops. *Ayetté*, containing several strong buildings, fortified and supported by some pieces of heavy artillery, formed their centre. After a fierce contest of

five or six hours, during which the Carlist general was killed by a musket-shot, the enemy's first and second lines of entrenchment were carried by assault—their third and last yet remaining to them; on which, however, they made a firm stand, successsively repelling several attempts to penetrate. Towards noon the British Commodore's * steamer the Phœnix came into the bay, and opened a well-directed fire from a 68-pounder gun at the distance of about a mile, against the last redoubt held by the enemy, and then nearly surrounded by our troops preparatory to a final attack. This being supported by a reinforcement of a thousand infantry of the Legion just arrived from Santander,—the Carlists were routed, and pursued for a considerable distance, with the loss of their artillery, and all their positions.

The natural strength and care with which these lines had been fortified, the pertinacity and vigour of the defence rendered it impossible to achieve this service without great efforts and a severe loss— ours having been 97 officers and 900 men, that of the

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* Lord John Hay, whoze zealous and able co-operation was so frequently afforded. This was the first practice on service with the large hollow shot. The result was highly satisfactory—five or six of these shot took effect, and sufficiently damaged a portion of the work attacked, as to render it practicable of ascent to the troops.

enemy of a similar proportion. The fall of Segastibelsa (after Zumalacarregui the most effective and influential of the provincial chiefs) was considered a severe blow to the Pretender's party.

Of the conduct of the troops on this occasion, the subjoined, from the French Commander-in-Chief on the frontier, one of the most distinguished of Napoleon's generals, may probably be considered an impartial testimony.*

The remaining Forces of the enemy in our immediate front—were not more than we could easily

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* "I embrace with eagerness this occasion of congratulating you on the affair which you have just conducted with so much distinction, under the walls of St. Sebastian. I have known for a long time the positions which you have carried. I have been also informed, almost from day to day, of the preparations of defence. I am able therefore to appreciate all the difficulties which your brave troops have had to surmount. Whatever may be the losses you have sustained, the results of this combat reflect the greatest honour on the English soldiers, and above all on their officers who have given such brilliant proofs of devotion and intrepidity.

"I must assure you, General, that everywhere here the news of this affair has excited the most lively sentiments of sympathy; as for myself, I participate with all my heart in those feelings of interest, and I can assure you that no one can be more happy than I am (an old General of the Empire), of the successes gained by the arms of His Britannic Majesty, &c. &c. &c.

"Cte HARISPE,

"Head Quarters.—7th May." "Peer of France."

deal with. But the Pretender's army were within reach, consisting of 45 battalions of infantry, 1200 horse, and 2000 aduaneros or light troops. And acting from a central position, almost the whole of that force might at any time be concentrated within 48 hours, against our isolated corps (then only) of 6000 infantry, in position at Ayetté. To guard against this constantly possible contingency, needed all our precautions.

Until the spring of 1837, we had rarely at our disposal more than two or three days' supplies at a time, sometimes even less,—great precariousness constantly existing on the subject.—So that with regard to offensive operations, it became necessary to calculate, not only on a sufficient force to retain possession of the posts acquired, but also to cover convoys of provisions to them twice a week or oftener,—and in case of failing in the means of doing so, to have the power of bringing off the artillery and stores in these advanced positions. Those desiderata were wanting. The only remedy was *money*, and that could not be had. The same causes interfered with all operations requiring punctuality of combination. But in this there was nothing unprecedented. In the records for instance of the seven years war of the North American States to achieve their emancipation from the British Crown, we shall also find the

same or greater distresses impeding and baffling the patriot army, notwithstanding very considerable pecuniary aids from France.

On the 7th of May, 1836, two days after the action referred to, EGUIA, the then Commander-in-Chief of the rebels, arrived with a large body of troops in the neighbourhood of Hernani, with the declared intention of driving the Auxiliaries back to San Sebastian. An examination of our position, or the report of a movement of the army from Vitoria, induced him to forego that intention and retrace his steps with the greater part of his troops.

The acquisition of the strategical point of Hernani, with a view to its permanent and secure retention, would of course have been most desirable,—but this required co-operation from the main army, and that was not for several days to be counted on. On the other hand, the reasons for dispossessing the enemy of Passages were pressing,—for there were no other means of obtaining the continued presence on the insurgent coast, of the British squadron. The capture of this port, which was of great value to the enemy, (the only one in their possession) was in fact the condition of the co-operation of the British national flag and maritime force, and to which the utmost importance was

attached on political as well as other grounds.* The anchorage is unsafe in the bay of San Sebastian. Passages is the sole roadstead on that dangerous coast for ships of war in bad weather.

Accordingly, the position of Ayetté being placed in sufficient security, the troops passed the Uromea river on the 28th May, re-established the communication by a bridge of boats, drove the enemy with little loss from the adjoining tract of country, and in conjunction with the English steamers and Spanish gun-boats, attacked and got possession of the town and port referred to, the enemy leaving some stores and light guns in the castle.

Our position was now (including communications) about nine miles in extent. The enemy, being reinforced by 12 Navarrese and Castillian battalions, attempted to surprise our right before day on the 31st May,—attacked the centre with great vigour and resolution on the 6th June, and the extreme left partially on the 9th. On each of these days they were completely repulsed, with a total loss of about 1400 men;—ours, from the advantages of position, considerably less. The action of the 6th

* "How invaluable would it be, if you were able to extend your acquisitions to Fontarabia and Passages!"—From the President of the Council, 12th May.

June was well contested. The enemy advanced to the charge more than once, in columns of battalions, reserving their fire, and in very good order.—As the main body of the Queen's forces had retired to cantonments, and the whole Carlist army were at liberty to come down upon us, we could not venture to follow up this success.

On the 11th July a movement was made with 5000 men by our left, towards Fontarabia,* in consequence of an urgent communication from the head-quarters of the army, and of information being received that the enemy were preparing to abandon that place. On arriving before it, it was found, on the contrary, that they had added to its defences; and being unprovided with the artillery necessary for reducing it, the column was withdrawn to its previous positions, with the inconsiderable loss of some 20 killed and 80 wounded,—the casualties of the enemy being about the same. This small affair was infinitely rejoiced in by the English Carlists, as the "greatest disaster that ever befel troops!" as "another proof of the false policy of the British Ministers!" and of "the ultimate triumph of Don Carlos."

On the 1st of October the centre of our position

* During this movement the officer in command was scarcely able, from severe illness, to continue on horseback.

at Alsa, was again attacked by about 10,000 men, including some armed peasantry. The cannon and musket fire continued for twelve hours. In the latter part of the day the enemy were obliged to mass the whole of their force on the entrenched heights of Ametzagana, for the protection of a battery threatened by our troops,—thus exposed to a cross fire of artillery, as they were of musketry in the earlier part of the day, their loss was estimated at 1200, ours being under 500. Similar attacks were made against the French Legion, which, with seven or eight Spanish battalions, occupied the Zubiri lines near Pamplona, and in which the enemy were similarly repulsed.

This campaign opened with an important success, and might have been the last in which Don Carlos would have ventured to remain on the Spanish soil. That it was not so is probably to be traced to political rather than military causes. But we must go back three or four months.

In the beginning of May, 1836, operations commenced. On the 14th of that month, MENDIZABAL'S Ministry resigned their offices. On the 16th ISTURIZ was appointed President of the Council. On the 22nd the main body of the Queen's forces advanced from Vitoria, and after

some warm affairs with the enemy, arrived at Salinas.—But on the 27th the troops were withdrawn from Salinas, and returned to Vitoria. On the following day, (that on which Passages was captured by the corps near San Sebastian) the General-in-Chief left the army at Vitoria for Madrid, in compliance with communications from Government,—to assist, as is understood, in some ministerial arrangements; —the action and combinations of the army being consequently paralyzed.

The news of these events did not reach San Sebastian till some days after the movement of the 28th, before-mentioned. That movement, and the extension of the position arising from it, were of course based on the calculation of continued offensive operations by the whole army. Had it been possible to anticipate the dispersed and enfeebled state to which the army was to be reduced, by the internal affairs of the country, (through in fact a premature rivalry of parties)—a different course might have been adopted.

The new Ministry were accused of intending a violent retrograde policy, through the support, and at the instance, of a paramount French influence; and with this object, of preferring to terminate the civil war by French—rather than by the national arms. With what degree of foundation, if any,

these imputations were made, is wholly beyond the knowledge of the author of these memoranda. It was, however, no just ground of prejudice that the Cabinet of the Tuilleries evinced at this period a decided disposition to support the Queen's government. THIERS then directed the foreign policy of France. To that enlightened statesman was attributable the project of a new Legion of 14,000 strong to be employed in the Basque provinces, and to consist of picked officers and men from the best regiments of the army, under the command of an experienced general officer. This force might perhaps have worn the Spanish cockade, but as it would have had all the elements of a corps of *elite* of the French army, with the means of pay, subsistence, &c. secured, together with the protection and countenance of the King and the military authorities, the decisive effect it must have had, in conjunction with the troops already in the field, cannot be doubted. With regard to the English Government, it gave the same zealous, loyal, and generous support to this, as it had done to every successive Ministry called on to administer the Queen's government, without the least reference as to whether its supposed bias may have been—liberal or aristocratic,—French or English.

Still the most unfavourable opinions gained ground as to the intentions of the Ministry. A storm of popular opposition was the consequence. The

Cortes, then sitting declared by a large majority against them. The populace of Madrid almost menaced their personal safety. The Cabinet, nothing daunted, dissolved the Cortes, and proceeded to a new election. But in the great provincial towns the opposition became furious. In Zaragossa, Malaga, Seville, Cordova, Grenada, Valencia, &c., the same scenes of revolt (and in some cases, of bloodshed), were re-enacted, which had overthrown the Ministry of TORENO — with this important addition, that the democratic Constitution of 1812 was now in all those places, formally proclaimed.

The General-in-Chief, as has been stated, left the army for Madrid on the 28th of May, 1836, and returned, it is supposed, about the 20th of June. The resumption of offensive operations might then of course have been looked for. But this was soon impossible, as the army became weakened by detachments of several battalions to Madrid, Zaragossa, &c. for the repression of the disorders occasioned by the change of Ministry and the dissolution of the Cortes.

In the mean time the failure of the repeated attacks on the English and French Legions and the Spanish troops acting with them, caused the removal of the rebel Commander-in-Chief *Eguia*, (replaced by *Villareal*), and a change in their

system of operations.—Determining to profit by the confusion and party collisions which reigned at Madrid and in the great towns, the advisers of the Pretender adopted the plan of expeditions into the interior. The principal of these under *Gomez*, consisting of 4,500 men lightly equipped, but with a quantity of spare arms, advanced from Orduna on the 26th of June, 1836, directing their course to the Asturias and Galicia, (subsequently through Castile and Andalusia,) and were immediately pursued by General Espartero, then commanding 6 or 7,000 men on the left of the line. Scarcely any march on record equalled the rapidity of this expedition. Espartero fell upon their rear-guard near Oviedo, but the main body escaped. Gomez, joined by considerable numbers in his progress, destroyed two or three detachments of new levies which crossed his path. Alaix had an affair with him near Robledo, and took 1,300 prisoners. Narvaez also gained some partial successes. But Madrid and all the open towns in the kingdom were thrown into consternation, by this hardy and ruthless band of plunderers. Demands for the protection of troops were made from various quarters. The corps near San Sebastian had to detach to Santander and the Asturias, five battalions with this object,—two of British Auxiliaries, three of Spaniards.

Altogether 42 battalions and 8 squadrons were successively detached from the army of the North

in pursuit of, or for protection against Gomez, and the smaller expedition of Sanz—the army thus becoming so much diminished as to be incapable of undertaking any operation.—General Cordova now resigned the chief command in the North, and retired to France. General Bernelle also retired about this time from the command of the French Legion, on the ground, it is understood, of the impossibility of maintaining its efficiency with the supplies granted him. General Le Beau (one of Buonaparte's Colonels of the old guard), succeeded Bernelle, but resigned in about two months. General Conrad was next appointed to that command, and held it for six or seven months, when he also resigned; but terminated in action his gallant career, before the official acceptance of his resignation.—Eventually likewise the Portuguese contingent retired across the Ebro and returned to Portugal—against the remonstrances of the Spanish Government.

But there was at this time no portion of the army so embarrassingly or vexatiously situated as the British Auxiliaries:—

"The nature and constitution of the British "army (we are informed from the highest source) "absolutely requires that it should be re-"gularly paid. It cannot plunder or take "what it wants upon requisition like the French "army — because it is not sufficiently numer-

"ous; and all the necessaries and much of the "food of the soldiers depend on their regular "payment."

"The constitution, and the whole system of the "discipline and equipment of the British army, "depends upon regular payments."

"(Again)—a starving army is worse than none, "the soldiers lose their discipline and spirit, they "plunder even in the presence of their officers. The "officers are discontented, and are almost as bad as "the men; and with the army which a fortnight "ago beat double their numbers, I should now "hesitate to attack a French corps of half the "number."

Before Burgos, *October*, 1812: "*Something or "other has made a terrible alteration in the troops "for the worse. They have lately, in several in- "stances, behaved very ill; whether it be owing to "the nature of the service, or their want of pay, I "cannot tell, but they are not at all in the style they "were. I am rather inclined to attribute their mis- "behaviour to the misery and consequent indifference "of both officers and soldiers, on account of their "want of pay.*"*

The Auxiliaries were not actually starving, though often in danger of being so, but in other respects these Extracts are not inapplicable.

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* Despatches.

It was but just previous to the overthrow of the late Ministry that the financial resources of Government appeared to improve. Supplies were collecting for the month of May on the French coast. Four months of arrears were in course of liquidation by bills on London. Thus the causes of dissatisfaction were disappearing, to the more complete removal of which, the prospect of continued operations would have so much contributed But this prospect was put an end to by the circumstances already described. The contractors and bankers at the same time, who are a sort of barometer in these matters, being alarmed by the events at Madrid and the excitement of public feeling—threatened to stop the supply of provisions from alleged want of funds, but not less so from want of confidence in the stability of the new Ministry,—actually stopping the payment of the arrears, and withholding the sums necessary for the subsistence of the soldier. Renewed discontent and distrust were the consequences:—to foment and aggravate which there were not wanting numerous English emissaries. An accidental vagueness in the original conditions of enlistment, as to the period being for *one* or *two* years, was at that moment productive of the most mischievous effect. The end of *one* year's service was about to expire. Whole regiments on this plea, demanded their discharge; others their discharge or their arrears, declaring they had enlisted

only for the lesser period. Numerous resignations of officers also took place on various grounds.

In short, a series of mutinies followed. These did not come by surprise on the commander of the force.* He had repeatedly during several months warned the Government that such must be the result.

Unfortunately, what increases the inconvenience in such cases, is, that the mutineers have some degree of justice on their side. Eventually, by disarming and sending away several hundreds of the most intractable, these disorders were subdued, but of course not without a permanent irremediable injury to the discipline of the corps.

We must now revert to the state of affairs at Madrid. The hostility of the popular party had been pronounced, as already observed, in the strongest manner against the existing Ministry. This Ministry had really the support of the French Cabinet. But that was not enough. To continue the Administration in defiance of the paramount influence in the provincial capitals, was an act of

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* They broke out however at an unlucky moment, during which he was under the influence of the indisposition before adverted to, and which deprived him for some weeks of all power of personal exertion.

shallow temerity tending to compromise the safety of the throne!

On the night of the 11th August, 1836, the sergeants and privates of some battalions of provincial guards, doing duty at San Ildefonso, rose, surrounded the palace where the Queen Regent then was, and demanded admittance to the Royal presence. This it was at length found impossible to refuse. Dismissal of the Ministry and the Constitution of 1812, were the terms, insisted on by this lawless band. Their demands, we may however infer by the result, were partly countenanced by the state of opinion in the great cities. Acquiescence was indispensable and inevitable. In these trying and deplorable circumstances, the august person most exposed to the revolting outrage, was the one most conspicuous for her complete presence of mind, discretion, and equanimity.

On the 13th of August, 1836, the Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed by Royal decree, but with this important proviso—"*Until the nation, represented by the Cortes, shall have manifested its will, or adopted another Constitution according to its wants.*"—From which was to be inferred, that even the most extreme of the Exaltados had become conscious of its impracticability as a permanent system; now desiring therefore its adoption only as a temporary measure.

On the following day, Senor CALATRAVA was invested with the *Presidency* of the Council. The members of the *Isturiz* Cabinet and their principal supporters, fled from the capital and retired to France. But tranquillity was quickly restored; the elevated character and known purity of intention of the *President* inspired confidence, and the provincial cities resumed their submission to Government.

These events led to the dissolution of the French Auxiliary corps forming at *Pau*,—the overthrow of the *Thiers* Cabinet,—the abandonment of his policy,—and the introduction of the Ministry of Count *Molé*, the tenor of whose measures endangered (to say the least) not only the Quadruple, but the English alliance.

The *Calatrava* Ministry remained in office for about a year—a long period for such times. But the pecuniary distresses of the Government, and consequently of the army, were for several months (owing to the event just mentioned) greater than ever.

But to return to military affairs.—Notwithstanding the cruel treatment of the few stragglers of the Auxiliaries who fell into the hands of the Pretender, he appears to have become ambitious of having in his own army a similar force. Accordingly the

subjoined proclamation* was circulated within our lines. This, though contrary to the usages of war,

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* To the Soldiers of the British Legion.

From the General-in-Chief, in the name of our King, his Royal Majesty, Charles Fifth.

Soldiers,—For the sake of yourselves keep silence.

I have made you no offers until now that I find myself enabled to perform whatever I promise. If you join our army, who are fighting for the right and legitimate claim which I have on the crown of Spain, you shall have every thing that a soldier requires, receiving the reward that I now promise you. Many of your comrades have joined our ranks; they can tell you how they have been received by me, and what kind of treatment they have. Follow their brave, their bold example; we will receive you with love and affection; you will then join our brave soldiers, who fight for our God, our religion, and our King. You will be rewarded as follows:—To every sergeant, corporal, or soldier that presents himself to me, and joins our army with his horse and arms, fifty dollars; and he will be enrolled in our British Legion, where he will receive the best treatment.

He that joins with his horse alone, thirty-five dollars.

Every sergeant, corporal, or private that joins us, bringing with him from thirty to forty men, shall be made an officer.

If he joins with from forty to sixty men, he will receive a Lieutenant's commission.

If he brings over from sixty to eighty men, he will be made Captain; and the officers, sergeants, and corporals, that are required to fill up the troop in his company, shall be made from the men who join with him.

Any man who is the means of bringing over 300 men shall receive a commission as Lieutenant-Colonel in the British Legion.

was complimentary, as indicating the estimation entertained by the enemy, of the utility of the corps. It was not without some partial effect; but as none but the most worthless characters (a proportion of whom are to be found in all armies) availed themselves of these offers, the enemy were unable to realize their intentions.

The greatly diminished strength of the Queen's army, owing to the various detachments from it into the interior of the kingdom, was not unknown to the Carlists; calculating on which, they again laid siege to Bilbao. The firm and energetic conduct of the citizens of that town, during their various trials in this war, is well known. The force with which to raise the siege, available to General Espartero, who had been recently appointed General-in-Chief, was then comparatively small. The garrison, however, was reinforced, and ample (6,000 men). General Evans detached to their assistance 1300

Soldiers! by your joining us quickly you will be the means of putting an end to this horrible warfare. You have before you a noble career.

Come, then, and enrol yourselves in the ranks of the legitimate Sovereign, and I pledge my royal word that all I have promised shall be performed.

EL CONDE DE CASA EGUIA,
The General-in-Chief of his Majesty's Army.

From Head-Quarters, June, 1836.

Spanish troops,* four twenty-four pounders, and considerable stores; as did Lord John Hay twelve pieces of cannon, and a most effective detachment of British Royal Artillery.

Early in December, the remains of the bands of Gomez and Sanz with difficulty accomplished their flight and return into the provinces. The former, after having caused so much alarm, having entered and plundered so many open towns, having marched above 2000 miles without finding any where a sufficient support or place at which to make a stand, were now reduced to 1500 men in a completely unserviceable and ruined state;† those of Sanz being in a similar plight, and reduced to 800.

This was most opportune, as the superior forces which had been in pursuit now also successively returned, and thus augmented the army of Espartero to nearly 20,000 men. But the positions of

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* Which secured Portugalette, the key of the exterior defences. The 4th British Auxiliary battalion was also detached to co-operate, but owing to the steamer in which it was embarked being driven back and disabled by stress of weather it did not reach its destination.

† Gomez, whose feats were so celebrated in England, was placed in arrest by the Pretender, and has never been since entrusted with any command.

the enemy were most formidable; relying on which they continued to press the siege with unabated exertion.—The Azua, an unfordable river, was to be passed by the relieving army under the fire of several fortified posts on the crest of a mountain ridge, defended by a numerous infantry and artillery. Towards the close of day on the 25th of December (the tide answering at that time), one thousand of the Spanish Guards were passed across this river in Spanish and British boats.* Under cover of this force, which gallantly maintained itself on the opposite bank, a temporary bridge was constructed, by which, in the course of a few hours, the passage of the whole army was effected. A storm and heavy fall of snow favoured this operation. Towards midnight, Espartero placed himself at the head of the troops, and led them to the charge. All the positions of the besiegers were carried, and as day broke they were seen in complete flight, leaving in the hands of the victors their stores, ammunition, and 25 pieces of cannon.

Night operations, even with the best troops, are liable to peculiar risks. The influence of mutual

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* Under Captain Lapidge of the Royal Navy, who commanded the British ships in the river, and rendered many essential services towards the defence of Bilbao.

observation and of the desire of distinction, are comparatively lost. The steadiness and resolution of the Queen's troops in this highly brilliant affair reflected great honour on them.—There are moments when the success of an attack on a single point, may decide, not only the fate of an action, but even that of a campaign. Then it is, when the example and personal exposure of a chief—may not only be justifiable, but do more for victory, than the coolest or most sagacious calculations.—Such was the conduct of *Espartero* on this, as on other eventful occasions,—and to the glory of which he is so justly entitled.

The relieving army were deficient of magazines, money, shoes, and means of transport. And until relieved from some of these wants, the General-in-Chief did not deem it advisable to penetrate farther, in such an inclement season, into the interior. In a level fertile country, and especially if there are large towns, such for instance as a considerable portion of France, Belgium or Italy, an army may generally feed itself with good regulation,—but where there are no great towns, where the population are thoroughly organised and inveterately hostile, the case will be very different, so long at least as there is any parity between the contending forces.

No man has a right to undertake a chief com-

mand in the field, without being prepared to endure severe trials, to struggle devotedly with difficulty and want, and with any description of peril. But the Christino generals in this war have been expected to dispense with all those means and resources, which have to a great extent governed the operations of the most eminent commanders of all times. To follow up this subject, however, might be uninviting to the general reader:—We shall therefore content ourselves with shewing, how former wars were at times influenced by similar causes, and deficiency of supplies deemed by the best authority—a real impediment to offensive movements:—

"I must retire (says he) into Portugal to seek "food, if food should not be supplied in Spain."

"It is extraordinary that the Minister did not "advert to these circumstances (want of food, "want of forage, privations of the soldiers) which "have been frequently laid before him: or, that "adverting to them he should have proposed to "me *any operation of any description*, to which he "must have known I was unequal."

"But, in fact, it has for some time been very "obvious to me, that I was unable to undertake "any offensive operation of any description. The "want of provisions and means of transport are so "great, &c. &c."

"I am unable to co-operate in any movement of

" any description, having no provisions, no stores,
" no means of transport."—" I could not co-operate
" in any forward movement, but must withdraw
" from Spain."

" The army cannot exist in the shape of an
" army, unless those supplies and means are pro-
" vided."—" And if (Spain) cannot or will not
" make the exertion necessary, in order to secure
" those supplies and means, Spain must do without
" the services of the army."

" The money for which I have been waiting, ar-
" rived here on Sunday, and the army has marched
" forward."

" It is unfortunate that I could not march ten or
" twelve days ago. I believe that much of this
" delay and failure is to be attributed to the want
" of experience of our Commissariat; much to the
" want of money, and to our discredit in Portu-
" gal, &c."

" The money which had been sent to Cadiz to be
" changed, arrived at Lisbon on the 15th, and with
" the army on the 25th; and we marched yester-
" day, having been obliged to halt nearly three
" weeks for want of money."—" It will be better
" for Government in every view of the subject,
" to relinquish their operations in Portugal and
" Spain, if the country cannot afford to carry
" them on."

" We are starving, and are ill treated by the

" Spaniards in every way; but more of this here-
" after. There is not a man in the army who does
" not wish to return to Portugal."

" If I give (to the Portuguese) any of the money
" I now command, not only will the British army
" be unable to move, but it must starve."

" I propose that the whole of the army should
" move forward in a few days, when the money
" shall have arrived to pay them."

" One of the great difficulties which I have in
" moving, is the want of money. However, I have
" reason to expect that will be removed at an early
" period, &c. The arrival of either (money) would
" enable me to march forthwith, as I have reason
" to expect the shoes and other necessaries every
" moment."

" If they will do so, (that is, if the Spanish
" Government will lend 100,000*l.*) and will
" send the money to Badajoz, I shall move forth-
" with."

" When I wrote to you last, I was in hopes that I
" should have marched before this time, but the
" money is not yet arrived."—" I am apprehensive
" that you will think I have delayed my march
" unnecessarily since my arrival upon the Tagus.
" *But it was and is quite impossible to move without*
" *money.* Besides, this army requires rest after
" their expedition to the frontiers of Galicia, and
" shoes, and to be furnished up in different ways.

" I hope that you will attend to my requisitions for " money."

" We are terribly distressed for money."—" Two " months pay is due to the army."—" Pay is due " to the troops, and we have not a shilling, or the " chance of getting any."—" In short we must have " money from England, if we are to continue our " operations in this country."—" You should now " send us 300,000*l.* as soon as possible."—" The " army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble " who cannot bear success any more than Sir John " Moore's army could bear failure."

" Your Excellency is informed of the history of " the causes (want of means), which led to the " late change in our operations, from the offensive " after a victory, to the defensive."

" If we had 60,000 men instead of 20,000, in all " probability we should not have got to Talavera to " fight the battle, for want of means and provi- " sions. But if we had got to Talavera, we could " not have gone further, and the armies would " probably have separated for want of means of " subsistence, probably without a battle; but cer- " tainly afterwards."

" If circumstances should prevent the Govern- " ment from supplying us with money, it ought to " become a question with them whether they should " keep us here, *for we can do nothing without* " *money.*"

These brief but expressive sentences mark the estimation placed by one of the greatest military men that ever appeared— on money, magazines, shoes, &c. —and clearly prove that similar complaints of similar wants by Spanish Generals, —have not been always such idle or blameable pretences, as they have been represented to be.

A combined movement of the three corps of the army, under *Espartero*, *Sarsfield*, and *Evans*, was now determined on, with the object of driving the Pretender out of *Guipuscoa*, and breaking up his military establishments in that province, the stronghold and citadel of the rebellion. For this purpose the corps near San Sebastian was reinforced by the Spanish van-guard division, of from 5000 to 6000 men, which (independent of garrisons) would enable it to enter on operations with from 11,000 to 12,000 bayonets, and an effective artillery. But the distresses of the army, especially of Sarsfield's corps, delayed for many weeks the commencement of this operation. The total strength of all arms of the enemy in the provinces at that period may be estimated at 35,000 men, with about 100 pieces of artillery, only a small proportion, however, being horsed; —but the chief advantage of the Carlists was their central position, protected by natural barriers, and the comparative small numbers they required for garrisons.

Espartero's force, consisting of about 22,000 men, was to advance from Bilbao on *Durango, Bergara,* &c. This was to take effect simultaneously with the junction of *Sarsfield* and *Evans* at OYARZUN,—whence the two latter (nearly 20,000 strong when united) were to advance on Hernani, Tolosa, &c. The following extract from a despatch of Sarsfield's (dated January 18) will best describe his proposed movement:—

" I likewise proposed that the troops under my " command should join your Legion at *Oyarzun,* " or thereabouts, &c. and commence operations by " taking Hernani, &c. (But) I find myself full of " trouble. Not a sixpence wherewith to pay the " troops, nor even to attend to the sick in the hos- " pitals! Officers from five to six months in ar- " rears. In such a distressing situation you will " easily conclude that no serious operation or " movement on my part can be undertaken; it is " out of the question. *Je ne sais en verite en* " *donner de la tête.* Nevertheless I shall employ " every effort in my power to hold out and prevent " the dissolution of the army in its precarious si- " tuation. In the event of a favourable change in " pecuniary matters, here is my plan of operations. " At the head of ten battalions and some cavalry, " I shall move in the direction of *Valaté, Bastan,* " and *Vera,* and should no material obstacle op-

" pose me, the forces will continue their march " towards *Oyarzun*, or possibly beyond that town, " in order to approach your head-quarters, as near " as possible. From thence I shall pay you my " respects in person, and in conformity with your " views and desires our future operations shall be " determined. So I must conclude, and hoping to " have the pleasure of seeing you before the end " of the month, " I remain, &c.

" C. SARSFIELD."*

" *To Gen. Evans.*"

Other letters of a similar import were received, explaining the reasons of subsequent postponements. Some money and supplies, however, having reached Pamplona, and there appearing no longer a sufficient cause of delay, *Evans* moved qut on the 10th of March,† by his left, with a view to the occupation of a position enabling him to proceed when it should be necessary, to *Oyarzun* or *Vera*, to cover the repeatedly indicated operation from Pamplona upon those places.

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* Though never in England, he spoke and wrote our language perfectly.

† Having duly apprised Sarsfield on the 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 9th March, of such being his intention.

The position sought to be occupied with this object ran along the Ametza and Garbara range of heights, on which the enemy were strongly posted, supported by several enclosed redoubts and entrenchments. These were attacked at day-break by the Christino troops in several columns, and carried in a very gallant style.—The enemy, consisting of about 8000 men, now chiefly established themselves on some lofty and almost inaccessible craggy eminences beyond our extreme left, from whence they maintained a very heavy fire throughout the day, but without making the least impression on our troops. The mutual loss, however, was considerable, and probably not dissimilar in amount—ours being nearly a thousand in killed and wounded, sustained for the most part by the Spanish 5th and van-guard divisions.

The operations being thus commenced, and the corps established on strong ground, nearly close to the main road, and within two miles of the appointed rendezvous, it next became necessary to have some intelligence of the movements of Sarsfield's column; and in the interim to place the reverse fronts of the captured redoubts in a defensible state.

Espartero had advanced on the same day (the 10th) from Bilbao towards Durango. To his ad-

vance scarcely any resistance was offered, the enemy directing their chief attention to the defence of *Hernani*, and to the prevention (with that object) of the junction of the army corps of Pamplona and San Sebastian.

On the night of the 11th, the following letter, dated *Pamplona, 9th March*, was received from *Sarsfield*:—

" — I have to acknowledge your letters of the " 3rd, 4th, and 6th instant, but being entirely " taken up in preparing for a movement towards " the enemy's line in my front, I have no time left " to answer them at large at the present moment." —" You must be at the present moment engaged " with the enemy. I am determined to advance " immediately, laying aside every other considera- " tion. You shall see that I am as good as my " word. I know I throw on myself an immense " responsibility—*mais n'importe.*

" My second movement will I hope place me " near the enemy's centre of operations, and as " close to you as possible.—You may rely that " I shall advance probably before forty-eight " hours. I remain, &c. &c.

To Gen. Evans. " C. SARSFIELD."

This communication created the utmost astonishment. The movement previously decided on was that upon *Vera* and *Oyarzun*,—the only safe one for

a column of 8000 or 9000 men, during which the right flank would have continued close along the French frontier. According to the tenor, however, of the above, a sudden determination appeared to have been taken (without any reason whatever assigned) to march by *Lecumberi*, upon *Hernani*, towards our right instead of the left, in fact, in the opposite direction to that which had been agreed to.

It became indispensable however to commence a corresponding movement in order to be in readiness to assist or remedy the adoption of this new line of operation, if it should be persevered in :—and on the 12th, therefore, three battalions were passed by boats across the Uromea to the village of Loyola, of which and the heights above it, the enemy, after a sharp skirmish, were dispossessed. On the 13th a pontoon-bridge was constructed at this point.

On the 14th the following was received from the Assistant British Commissioner with Sarsfield's column, dated Pamplona, March 11th, 1837, 8 A. M.—" Sir, I am directed by General Sarsfield " to inform you that he will march within an hour " from this place with 6000 Spaniards and 2000 " French of the Legion, on which latter force he " begs to add he cannot depend, as they are insub- " ordinate, &c.; but having promised to assist " you in the movement you are about to make, he

" will do so. He will take the shortest road to the " enemy's lines, &c. " GEORGE E. TURNER,
" *To Gen. Evans,* " B. Royal Artillery."
&c. &c.

This removed all doubt. And all who had the least knowledge of the country, inferred from the project, the probability of the destruction of the column. The formidable mountain positions of *Lecumberi*, over which it would have to pass, were near the enemy's centre of operations, and for the defence of which they had 17 battalions and 1000 horse, capable of being largely reinforced in a few hours. The only chance of averting the apprehended consequences of the false movement thus announced,—was by a vigorous attack towards our front, in order to draw off, if possible, the attention of the enemy, at any risk. In doing which, however, having our lines to fall back on, no very serious disaster could result.

Accordingly on the 15th the troops advanced in two columns from Loyola and Ayetté, against the hill fort of Oriamendi and the range of fortified heights extending from it, which cover Hernani on the side of San Sebastian. The enemy made an obstinate resistance for several hours, but a charge with the bayonet towards the close of the day by two battalions of the Spanish Princessa regiment, and two of the Irish auxiliaries, decided the affair.

This was an important success, but the enemy's

remaining line of defence was extremely strong, extending from *Astigarraga* to *Santa Barbara*, with the walled town of *Hernani* in the centre. The chief strength of this position consisted in the rocky precipitous ridge of Santa Barbara, overhanging Hernani at a distance of about 500 yards, and which, (the ascent through the narrow interstices of the rocks being securely barricaded,) was totally unattackable in front. A redoubt connected the summit with the town.

On the morning of the 16th*, no intelligence being yet received from Sarsfield, and it being generally believed that he must then be either approaching from the side of Lecumberi, or possibly surrounded in the hills by the enemy, dispositions were made for the attack of Hernani and Santa

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* Our force on the position was as follows:—

Two battalions of the 2d Spanish Light Infantry		1,200
Spanish Marine battalion		550
British Royal Marine battalion		450
Chappelghorries . 280 Segovia Militia . 280 Oviedo Militia . . 250		810
Vanguard Division		2,700
British Legion		3,300
	Infantry	9,010
	Cavalry	100
	Artillery	200

1,500 detached to guard various redoubts, Passages, Alsa, Ametza, Lugaris, &c.

Barbara; and with this view a very considerable extension of the troops became necessary in order to turn or take in reverse, the enemy's flanking defences. In this moment of extension, the disposition least calculated for defence,* a strong reinforcement reached our opponents, consisting of eleven battalions,† with some cavalry and artillery, under the titular Commander-in-Chief of the rebels, Don Sebastian;‡—and being now superior to us by at least 5,000 men, they immediately assumed the offensive, with all the accidental advantage of the unexpected arrival of these additional troops on the field. The main road along which this column approached being completely screened by the lofty ridge of Santa Barbara; we had but a very brief notice of their presence. This made all the difference in the result.—The five or six battalions most in advance and in extended order, in front of our right, as well as of the left, were, in those difficult circumstances, thrown into confusion and rapidly driven back on our main position, of which the fort of Oriamendi, was the centre; and

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* The occupation of the Bridge of Astigarraga, which has been spoken of, would but have increased this extension, and the consequent advantage of the enemy.

† One of these had been detached from Hernani about a week previously. The others were select troops, composing what was called a "a flying column."

‡ The real command exercised by *Moreno*, who recently met a retributive death at the hands of Carlist soldiers at *Vera*.

on which the troops in reserve, and those which had not been closely engaged, now assembled, consisting of the Spanish battalion of marines; the English royal marines; the Princessa battalions, and the 9th, 10th, and Rifle auxiliaries. These latter corps held the Fort and strongest part of the heights;—the Royal and Spanish marines, and Auxiliary lancers being in the main road and on a little plateau close to the right of it, of about 200 yards diameter, nearly round which, a little below the summit, there ran an embankment which served as a breast-work for the Marines:—the 6th Auxiliary battalion and part of the 2d Spanish light infantry being directed to take post at about a quarter of a mile still further to the right, on a rocky knoll from which they very gallantly dislodged the enemy. This advance of the 6th battalion, and 2d Light Infantry, (which was perfectly successful,) and a charge of the squadron of lancers down the main road, were the only offensive movements made by us, after the Carlists had obtained their reinforcements.

It was now about 2 o'clock in the afternoon;—and though a good deal of firing continued, the enemy were totally unable to make any further impression.

Lord John Hay then intimated his intention of withdrawing the Marines, and royal and marine artillery to San Sebastian. As the marines were

the only fresh and unfatigued corps we had, not having marched above one or 200 yards during the day, (every other part of the force having had harassing exertions, and severe losses throughout the week),—their removal, while in the immediate presence of the enemy, could not but be inconvenient.—The Commodore was therefore earnestly requested (both by the officer commanding the Queen's forces and by the British Commissioner) to allow them to remain,—but this request was not successful. A delay however of a quarter of an hour to afford time for a Spanish regiment to relieve the Marines on the plateau was assented to. The withdrawal of this battalion was no doubt solely attributable to the threats of attack held out in Parliament against the employment of Marines in inland operations. For no one could have been more constant and truly devoted in his support of the Queen's cause on all occasions, than the noble and gallant officer alluded to. A similar testimony is also due to the British Commissioner Colonel Wylde, whose valuable services throughout the war cannot be too highly appreciated.

But this diminution of our force (at about three o'clock), was not of so much consequence—as almost at the same time a despatch arrived with intelligence that *Sarsfield*, on whose account the operation had been undertaken,—had again changed his mind, and gone back towards *Pamplona*,—as stated in

his letter, dated *Sarasa* (near Pamplona), 14*th March*, as follows:—

"My dear General,—At my request, and on the "point of advancing against the enemy in my front, "Mr. Turner had the honor of addressing your "Excellency a few lines to inform you that I was "ready to commence operations in the direction of "*Las dos Hermanas.* I did so, and the division "reached *Irursun* the same day at five o'clock. I "had in contemplation to proceed the following day "to *Lecumberi*, but the heavy fall of snow which "suddenly came upon us during the night pre-"vented the intended movement from taking place, "and obliged me to transfer the division to the "position it actually occupies.—Were it not for the "bad weather, I should have moved before now, "but that is not possible at present, &c. &c.

"*To General Evans.*" "C. SARSFIELD."

This intelligence ought to have reached us at least a day sooner:—an hour sooner would have made a considerable difference.—We were still however little more than a mile from Hernani,—but in the intervening space, there were 22 Carlist battalions and some cavalry. The capture of that place was therefore no longer possible. Co-operation with Sarsfield was at an end. A new arrangement with the General-in-Chief for a future combined operation was consequently necessary. Our own

lines of Ayetté were but three-quarters of a mile to the rear. There was no longer any present object in remaining on the intermediate less secure position.—At *half-past six o'clock* therefore, after damaging the parapets of the Oriamendi fort, and destroying the guns the enemy had left in it, (the steepness of the access rendering it difficult to bring them away), the troops retired to Ayetté, retaining what had been gained on the right of the Uromea. The enemy merely skirmished with the rear-guard.

The following is an extract from the despatch of the Commodore on the circumstances referred to:—

"As I considered the force belonging to his "Majesty's squadron employed on this occasion had "rendered all the assistance they were calculated "to afford, I directed the different detachments to "return to their ships, and the marine battalion "and artillery to the positions they occupy for the "protection of his Majesty's ships in the ports of "San Sebastian and Passages.

"*Sometime afterwards I observed her Catholic "Majesty's army retire to the Ayetté lines on the "left of the Uromea, which they continue to occupy "with the positions on the right of that river taken "from the insurgents on the* 10*th instant.*

"The losses sustained by her Catholic Majesty's "army, from the 10th to the 16th instant, amount "to about 1300 killed and wounded, and the most

" authentic information reports that of the insur-
" gents to be 2000.

" Her Catholic Majesty's forces in the action of
" the 16th did not exceed 9000 bayonets, and it is
" accurately ascertained that that of the insurgents
" amounted to 16,000.

" I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

" JOHN HAY."

The loss, Legionary and Spanish, in this day's affair was under 600; in England it was stated at 3,000. We took from the Carlists a colonel of cavalry and a few prisoners. They took from us a picket of 60 file of the Oviedo militia.* Beyond this, and our evacuating the fort after disarming it, which had fallen into our hands on the preceding day,—they had not the slightest military trophy to boast of. The immediate object, however of the operation, the junction of the two army corps, was not effected. Otherwise, the enemy, on the operations of the week, were the losers—as the fortified range of the Ametza taken in the action of the 10th, remained in our possession. Our *total*

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* The loss of a few prisoners on either side is not a very decided test of advantage—as for instance—in the defensive victory of Fuentes de Honor, 290 men appear to have fallen into the hands of the enemy,—in that of Albuera, 500;—in that of Talavera, 600, besides 1500 wounded;—of the Spanish co-operating army 400 men, and 40 pieces of artillery, &c.

lists of killed and wounded, officers and men, in the three general affairs of the 10th, 15th, and 16th of March, amounted to 1,200 Spaniards, 700 Legionaries, and about 20 of the Royal Marines;—the lowest estimate by the *Carlists* of their own loss, being 2,500.

Sarsfield's command at Pamplona was immediately transferred to *Irribarren*.—Sarsfield was quite right in retiring to Pamplona. Had he persevered in the movement by Lecumberi, a very serious result was to be apprehended. His error was in having ever intended to advance in that direction;—and *still more so*, in omitting, on the 12th or 13th, to acquaint *Evans* of the doubts he entertained, or decision he had come to, of retiring —instead of doing so on the 14th, the date of his letter. But to the shattered state of his health,* the circumstances related were in fact attributable. He was however an accomplished officer and high-minded gentleman,—had already commanded with distinction in the former Peninsular war,—and few more regretted his death (by the hands of a mutinous soldiery, two or three months after the time referred to,) than the writer of these pages.

"I have used my best exertions (said General "Harispe) to set the public mind right upon an event,

* His own expression.

" vexatious no doubt, but which the hateful spirit " of party and interested passions have already " turned to their own uses by exaggerations and " calumnies."—But, as was truly observed by another and yet greater authority—" *The fashion and the "spirit of the times, give encouragement to lies.*"*

Among the expedients resorted to in this spirit, and with the accustomed object of casting dishonour on the Legion, was that of invidiously contrasting them with the Royal Marines.† And this seemed the more gratuitous, as the excellent conduct of the latter, and particularly their firm bearing and well-directed fire from the plateau or breastwork before alluded to, which effectually checked three or four Carlist battalions then menacing that point,—had been most fully appreciated. But the reiterated assertions in Parliament and the press, that " the " Legion had fled into San Sebastian, covered and " protected by the Marines,"—that " the Marines " had saved the Artillery of the Legion," &c. &c. which by many are believed to this day,—did not contain a word of truth,—the fact being that the battalion mentioned was the only one, which went

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* Sir A. Wellesley.

† If the detachment of *Royal Artillery* had been chosen for this purpose, there had been more pretence for it, for they had certainly been more engaged with the enemy both at Bilbao and San Sebastian.

into San Sebastian at all,*—towards which it had commenced its movement some three hours or so, before the rest of the troops had left the position in front of the enemy. And as to the Artillery of the Legion having been thus saved or "covered in its flight," it was actually cannonading the Carlists from the original position of *Oriamendi*, when the Marines were already returning into the fortress, and perhaps preparing to enter their billets. That this corps therefore could have borne, as stated, the whole brunt of a (defensive) action, with so small a loss—as one man killed and some 20 wounded, without an officer being hurt,—is not very probable!

The Marines were also present in the successful and rather sanguinary affairs of the 10th and 15th March, but were fortunate enough not to have sustained on these occasions any casualty whatever. Now considering on the other hand that the Spanish and Legionary troops, at whose expense these exaggerations were put forth, had in their various combats about 5000 killed and wounded (including 400 officers), inflicting a far greater loss on the enemy, besides enduring many fierce

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* The Legion were *never quartered* in San Sebastian from the first day (May, 1836) on which they broke by assault the investment, till they embarked for England after the conclusion of their service (June, 1837).

struggles and privations, which did not fall to the lot of their distinguished comrades,—it must be obvious how superfluous to the well-established reputation of the latter, and unjust to that of the former, this course must have been! Fairness then, towards the whole of the troops engaged—requires this notice of the facts.

The Legion had fought several actions of more importance than that which has been just described,—but they were successful actions, and the English Carlists were therefore silent respecting them. But here was one of adverse result, and inexhaustible comment was the consequence. The great battles of Salamanca, Vittoria, Waterloo,—scarcely occupied a tenth-part of the period which the Legislature was compelled to devote to this comparatively small transaction. There was no end to the pretended lamentations of the "calamity," — "catastrophe," — and "unparalleled national disgrace," declared to have been sustained! "For ages!" said one, "for 600 years!" said another, British soldiers have not suffered such a disaster!—To military men observation on such expressions were needless. No war of any duration or parity between the contending forces was ever waged without alternations of success and defeat. And as for the troops in question, whatever may have been the hardships to which they were exposed, it will in fact be found, that so far from their having

experienced a more than ordinary degree of unfavourable results, their share of these has on the contrary been in a remarkably small proportion!

Thus, however, was the public time wasted during at least a dozen nights' fruitless debate—the main objects of course being, to discredit the Ministry,—defeat their policy,—uphold arbitrary principles,—decry the supporters of freedom,—and (though of less importance,) to get hold of the representation of a Metropolitan City;—the virulence however of some prominent individuals, giving reason to suppose that personal resentments and professional jealousies had their part in the zealous efforts to magnify the check (for it was no more) received by the Auxiliaries.

But we may perhaps be pardoned for noticing the amusing lapse of memory of the noble Lord who talked of "600 years," &c.—he having but just previously published an elaborate history of his own great grandfather (General Stanhope*), who terminated his military career in *Spain*, by the surprise and capitulation of *Brihuega*, surrendering with the whole of his force (5500 British and one Portuguese regiment) *prisoners*, and remaining so till the

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* An officer, notwithstanding, of undoubted merit.

end of the war;* in this, however, the noble author could discover, with the most candid intentions, "nothing that was negligent or blameable!"—and yet it might surely seem a greater mishap, than a retreat of the Legion of about *one mile*, without the loss of either men or guns captured by the enemy!

Still, such were the comparisons dwelt on, upon this subject, that it may perhaps be as well to point out,—that even the course of unexampled triumph of the PENINSULAR war, (so often unfairly referred to), was not, (any more than others), invariably fortunate,—of this, not only NINE unsuccessful sieges or assaults,† in which many thousands unavailingly perished, are ample proofs;—but also some four or five arduous retreats, of from 50 to 200 miles each, costing in killed, wounded, and prisoners, at least 20,000 men,—besides cannon, money, stores, equipages, and six or 7000 horses lost or destroyed, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy! Nor was it always possible, notwithstanding the ability and experience of the

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* The same accident which, it may be remembered, once occurred to a noble and gallant general, now high (and by his great services justly so),—in the Tory ranks, that of surrendering with the whole of his troops, *prisoners of war* (1806).

† Tarragona attacked *twice*, San Sebastian *twice*, Badajos *three* times, Burgos assaulted *four* times.—*But the Legion could not look at a Carlist town or post, and not take it,—without being held up to unmitigated aspersion and reproach!*

officers, to conduct those unavoidable movements with regularity, since (as the illustrious chief of the army himself states), the disorder was more than once, so complete,—" that from the moment the " troops commenced their retreat from Burgos on " the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the " officers lost all command over their men!"*

A further instance of this kind, was that of the French army-corps, which took possession of Portugal in 1807. This corps, beaten at *Vimiera*, in August, 1808, was irrecoverably lost to the enemy, had not the unrivalled complaisance of the British Generals, restored it by the convention of Cintra to France. In the December following, the same corps, (or the chief part of it), under MARSHAL SOULT, pursued for about 20 days the British troops, by whom it had been vanquished at Vimiera—causing them to abandon, in great discomfiture, the Spanish territory. SOULT, after this signal success, continued his victorious career to *Oporto*, —from whence, a few months later, (compromised by his isolated position, and conspired against by his own officers), he,—in his turn, was driven by WELLINGTON for above 100 miles over the mountains, with the loss of artillery, and everything belonging to the army,—escaping (by extraordinary exertion

* " Generals and commanding officers of corps, must be as " sensible as the commander of the forces, of the complete dis- " organization of the army."—*Gen. Order, Jan.* 1809.

and the highest display of talent) with the remnant of his forces to *Galicia*—in even a more disastrous condition than were the English troops whom he had so shortly before expelled from that province!

Again, during a similar retrograde but premeditated movement of the British army to *Torres Vedras*—the melancholy fact of 400,000 Portuguese,* who perished by disease or famine, may likewise be mentioned as a consequence of one of the previous failures referred to,—owing partly to the stern policy adopted for the defence of the country (that of compelling the population of entire districts to retire with the retreating army, *on pain of death*),—partly to the wanton cruelty of the invaders!

Such were among the stupendous misfortunes and horrors that occurred under *Tory* rule,—which now appear however to be wholly forgotten by the implacable "*Conservative*" critics of the pending contest! And such at all events will shew, that reverses of an infinitely greater proportionate magnitude than any that may be alleged against this small corps of Auxiliaries—were by no means unusual in former wars, and have befallen even the great and veteran national armies—whose achievements have shed the most imperishable lustre on their country!

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* General Sir John Jones.

On the unfair practice then to which this digression alludes, we shall only add, from the great *text-book* on military affairs before quoted,*—the following remarks, which though more personal than is applicable, or might have been expected—are still generally apposite, and convey a rebuke, not easy to evade :—

" The mode of attacking a servant of the public, " absent on the public service, day after day, in " speeches in Parliament, which has lately been " adopted, appears to me most extraordinary and " unprecedented."—" If I have done any thing " wrong or unbecoming my character, or that of the " station I filled, I ought to be prosecuted, or at " least censured for it, in consequence of a specific " motion on the subject."

" I see that the Common Council of the city of " London have desired that my conduct should be " enquired into."—" I cannot expect mercy at their " hands, whether I succeed or fail ; and if I should " fail, they will not enquire whether the failure is " owing to my own incapacity, to the blameless " errors to which we are all liable, to the faults or " mistakes of others, to the deficiency of our means, " to the serious difficulties of our situation, or to the " great power and abilities of our enemy. In any " of these cases I shall become their victim." (1810.)

But to return to our narrative.

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* *Despatches.*

Notwithstanding the boastings of the *English* Carlists on the affair of Oriamendi, it was evident that the chiefs of the rebel army had very different impressions, and were filled with the conviction that they had gained but a short respite from attack. Their preparations of defence on the line of Hernani and Irun, were therefore renewed on an extended scale. Large bodies of the peasantry again assisted in these labours;—several additional redoubts were constructed; — an augmentation of artillery took place;—and their infantry, within immediate reach, was gradually increased to about 30 battalions. In short, the possession of the great road between Hernani and Irun, always an object of anxiety to the enemy, became now that to which the exclusive efforts of the whole of both armies, were directed.

This was the Pretender's chief line of communication with France—it also led direct into the rear of his defences towards Biscay and the Ebro; it was that by which not only the political connexion of his adherents with France, and with their friends in other parts of Europe, was with most advantage and facility kept up,—but likewise along which they received the provisions, clothing, horses, and even materials of ammunition, the insurgent territory was unable to supply. The flag of rebellion continuing to wave on the walled towns of Irun and Fontarabia, the places of most importance on the

frontier, was also, in the estimation of foreign states, an additional disadvantage to the Queen's Government.

This will account for the importance of the original position taken up by the British Auxiliaries, which constantly menaced, and was almost within cannon shot of this main communication,—and explains why the enemy fought inch by inch for the intermediate ground, sacrificing several thousand men in their reiterated attempts to resist and throw back the Legion to the sea coast.

Towards the end of *April*, Evans's force on the Ayetté and Ametza lines was above 10,000; that of the enemy in his front 20,000, strongly posted, and with a considerable artillery. With these relative means, to dislodge them was impracticable. It could only be done by the junction of the main army, or the disposable part of it, from Bilbao,—which was accordingly decided on. This was effected by the British steamers under the direction of Lord John Hay.

The 1st division (six battalions) having arrived, Evans moved forward his left on the 3rd May, to Loyola and Aguirre, thus resuming the position of the 14th March,—to be in readiness to commence operations on the arrival of the remainder of the army. Before day, on the 6th, the enemy made a

bold attempt to recover Aguirre, with a column of 2000 picked troops, consisting of the flank companies of all the battalions on their line, supported by a larger force and some 24-pounders, at four hundred yards off, for which cover had been thrown up during the night. This post was held by the 2nd Spanish Light Infantry, with some field guns of the Legion, and was defended with great bravery. The Colonel of that regiment was killed. At the first rush the assailants got upon the crest of the position, but in a few minutes were driven down again with the bayonet. As day broke the affair became more general. The fire of the enemy's heavy cannon at point blank range, was very severe, —but after two or three hours' conflict, they were repulsed with great slaughter, and retired into their redoubts.

On the 9th, the General-in-Chief, Espartero, arrived, and on the 10th or 11th, the whole of his force (14,000 men) had disembarked. We were then 24,000 sabres and bayonets.* The enemy had not calculated on our being so strongly reinforced. It was an invariable principle of their tactics to avoid decisive affairs, unless with the advantage of great numerical superiority. But we had now, for the first time in these mountain

* Not 30,000 as has been stated.

and somewhat predatory operations, the hope of a battle on nearly equal terms, which might afford the prospect, if successful—of finishing the war.

But this the chiefs of the rebel army did not choose to hazard. The result of the affair of the 6th occasioned them much discouragement. On the night of the 11th or 12th May, they held a Council of War, at which it was finally decided, that they could no longer hope to hold this part of Guipuscoa, —that the artillery on the Oriamendi position should therefore be removed and concealed without delay in the interior of the country;—and the principal seat of the war, with the presence of the *Pretender*, transferred to some other province,—Catalonia, Arragon, or Castile,—as support might be obtained.*

To carry this into effect, their redoubts were disarmed and stores carried off on the following night, and the mass of their forces commenced their retreat to Navarre,—from whence the Pretender, with the chief officers and followers, civil, military, and ecclesiastical,—were therefore, as soon as possible, to proceed, accompanied by a strong and chosen body of troops.

The General-in-Chief advanced against Hernani

* Transferring the seat of war, was first thought of in the preceding January,—after the disastrous raising of the siege of Bilbao,—and it was kept in view as an alternative for any further unfavourable event.

on the 14th May. The enemy had left but 13 battalions in our front, to check the progress of the army, and succour, if possible, the fortified places which might be attacked. These battalions, though unable to offer successful resistance, made a firm defence of the strong positions they held, and even fought in the town, while its parapets were escaladed by some of the regiments of the Legion,—which, through the characteristic generosity of Espartero, were allowed to take the lead. The General-in-Chief established his head-quarters at Hernani, his outposts at Urnieta,—about ten Carlist battalions remaining in observation on the heights of Andoin.

On the 16th May, Evans moved with about 9000 men,* and the artillery of the Legion, consisting of ten guns,—to the attack of *Oyarzun*, *Irun*, and *Fontarabia*. Three Carlist battalions had been left for the defence of these places—and were stationed as follows,—two in Oyarzun,—one, with a body of armed peasantry, in *Irun* and *Fontarabia*.

The column arrived before Oyarzun at ten o'clock, when the battalions mentioned, after a slight skirmish, evacuated the town, whose gates were thrown open to us, and the enemy retired towards Mount St. Marcial, overlooking Irun, at a distance of about two miles.—Having left a bat-

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* Two Spanish divisions and the Auxiliaries.

talion in Oyarzun, and detached two battalions to prevent any interruption from those moving on *St. Marcial*,—the column continued its march to *Irun*, which by two o'clock was closely invested.

This, though but a walled town, and therefore incapable of sustaining a regular attack with heavy ordnance, was, against field guns and musketry, extremely strong. Many months had been employed in perfecting the defences. It was supported and partly covered, by the Fort del Parque, a circular work on a commanding eminence, with steep scarps, ditch, embrasures, and mounting eight guns of large calibre.†—The town-house, an ancient building, with massive walls several feet thick, against which light artillery could make no impression, was converted into a species of citadel.—The garrison, counting on being able to hold out for several days,—being assured that they should be relieved,†—and in case of reverse, that they would be put to death *in reprisal* for former acts,—fought with desperation.

The attack continued with vigour till night,—during which only a slight occasional musket-fire took place,—but at day-break recommenced. At

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* In the town there were five guns.

† And in fact, the enemy did collect some battalions from the Bastan and the side of Tolosa with that view.

seven o'clock (17th May), permission was asked or women and children to be allowed to leave the place, and pass into France,—which was granted. At ten (18 hours after the investment,) the Fort del Parque was captured,—and three columns, of two battalions each,* having surmounted by assault the defences of the different lines of entrance, arrived in front of the consistorial house, in which the survivors of the garrison had now taken post,—and where a sanguinary stand might still have been made,—but on being offered their lives, they surrendered.

Though this place was taken by storm, yet within *two* hours after its capture, order was perfectly restored, and the troops being formed up, commenced their march to Fontarabia.

As to the details of this attack, and the conduct of the troops,—the following may be referred to, from a memorial of the *Carlist garrison* to DON CARLOS:—

"In spite of the prodigious valour all displayed, the exterior "fortifications being demolished, and the enemy forcing their "way from house to house, it was impossible to resist the im- "petuosity and decision of the English division, who, fixing their "bayonets, and keeping up a horrible fire, attacked us on the "17th,—the few soldiers we had, having been for the most part

* Under Generals Jauregui, Chichester and Fitzgerald. During this service, the Spanish Generals Seoane, O'Donnell, and the Deputy of Cortez, Lujan, were also present, and ably assisted.

" disabled by the enemy's fire, retired with the armed peasants " to the Consistorial house, our last point of defence.

" As the British Legion were about to make an assault, death " appeared to us inevitable; resolved, however, to perish amidst " the ruins of the edifice, we saw the enemy's battalions advance, " prepare their scaling ladders, and surround us on all sides,— " the fort, Sire, the artillery of which might have supported us, " unable to resist the attack, surrendered, while the English " companies posted in the square, reinforced on all sides, gained " the ditch, and attempted to force the outer gate—at this critical " moment some officers of the Legion came forward, and with " the greatest generosity offered us quarter;—so unexpected an " offer, Sire, surprised us for a moment, but having pledged their " word of honour for our safety, and further resistance being " useless, we laid down our arms.

" It would lead us too far, Sire, were we to indulge in the " language of encomium, and dilate upon the delicacy and " deference which we experienced from men—WHO ON OUR " SIDE WE HAVE TREATED WITH ALL THE RIGOURS OF WAR,— " and at the same moment when with the deepest effusions of " our hearts, we see our officers and soldiers kindly treated, we " should be wanting in the noble feelings of gratitude, if we " omitted to acquaint your Majesty with such heroic conduct.

" Sire, the arms of your Majesty, although vanquished, have " come off with honour, because it is certain that since the com- " mencement of the war, no post, however strongly fortified and " garrisoned by so inadequate a force, has been defended with " such determination—a determination which those to whom we " owe our lives, designate by no other term than that of rashness.

" Sire, every officer and soldier who are here prisoners are " worthy of all consideration, and we, as their chiefs, and at " their request, venture to express our feelings to your Majesty, " *ardently entreating you to be pleased to command the chiefs of* " *your Royal Army to treat the individuals of the aforesaid* " *Legion, who may fall into their hands, with all humanity,*— " because that justice, the gratitude of your vassals, your royal

" and never belied clemency, and the better service of your " Majesty, appear to demand it.—Nearly 700 families, those of " the garrison of this town and Fontarabia, would have to deplore " the death of their fathers, brothers, relations, and friends,— " who all live, and live for your Majesty,—were it not for this " noble and generous conduct of their adversaries.

" Deign, then, your Majesty, to listen to the voices of so many " unfortunate men snatched from the brink of the grave—incline " a favourable ear to their petition, and be graciously pleased to " accede to it.—In the meantime, Sire, we fervently pray the " Almighty to preserve for many years your precious life.—To " be laid at the royal feet of your Majesty.

(Signed) " Colonel-Commandant, FRANCISCO LARODE.

" Commandant of Arms and commanding the line of the 19th May, 1837. " Bidassoa, JOSE ANTONIO SOROA.

" *To his Excellency the Minister of War, to be delivered to*

" HIS MAJESTY DON CARLOS V."

Before the publication of the above, it was declared in London that the Auxiliaries had massacred all their prisoners!—The original was delivered, at the request of the prisoners, to a Carlist officer, at the next out-post.* — A recollection of some

* The following appeared in the columns of perhaps the most consistent and honourable of our opponents of the press—" We " are gratified to find among these, a despatch from the Carlist " General to his *Prince*, acknowledging the humanity of the " British Legion, and calling upon the *Infante* to imitate it by " rescinding the Durango Decree.—IN THE HISTORY OF WAR " WE CAN FIND NO MORE HONOURABLE TROPHY THAN THIS ;— " and we rejoi e to say, that the despatch in question effaces from " our minds all suspicion that there can be any truth in the " slander cast upon the Legion by the French Government."— *Standard, 30th May*, 1837.

of the events of the preceding war,—and of the monstrous provocations in the present instance, will enhance, to the reader, the value of this remarkable testimony.

The bridge between Irun and Fontarabia, having been broken down by the enemy, it took some hours during the night to restore and pass our guns over it. In the morning (the 18th) Fontarabia was invested and summoned. The submission of this place was extremely desirable, as it might have occasioned a serious loss in men and time. *

The enemy replied to our summons, stating that "having heard we had put the garrison of Irun to death—they should defend themselves to the last!" On being assured this was not the case,—they asked permission to send two officers to Irun to ascertain the fact,—which was complied with.† On their return, (having seen and conversed with the prisoners at that place), a capitulation was drawn up, and the Queen's troops took possession of the

* It had strong stone revettments, nearly perpendicular, forty feet high. At two of the salient angles, the parapets and upper part of the rampart had been destroyed in the French Revolutionary war. But they were now built up, and quite secure against a coup de-main.

† During the parley, a number of the armed peasantry, which formed part of the garrison, as also of the soldiery, escaped to France.

fortress,—which, from its position near the mouth of the Bidassoa, and directly opposite the French coast, was a very important acquisition.

This occurred on the 18th May. On the 20th Don Carlos quitted the Basque Provinces, with a force of 12,000 men, directing his march through Upper Arragon to Catalonia.—General Irribarren, with the troops from the Ribera, hung upon the rear of this column.

A medal was granted by the Queen Regent to the troops engaged in the assault of Irun.*—The Government expressed the warmest approval, both in public and private communications—of one of the latter the following (dated Madrid, 29th May), is a passage—" I congratulate you from my " heart upon the successful termination of all that " depended upon you for the taking of the enemy's " strong holds, and opening the communications " with France.—The Legion, by its valour during " the attack, and its humanity after the combat " was over, has indeed achieved a signal triumph " over its most base calumniators."

The possibility of an expedition, by which the

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* As also for that of the fortified lines of Ayette, in the preceding year—inscribed with the words " Espana Agradecida."

enemy might seek to escape from some of the consequences of the operations of the combined force near San Sebastian, had not been unforeseen,—as may appear from the following extract of the original plan of the General-in-Chief, viz.—"The remaining disposable force in Navarre (perhaps six or seven battalions) might guard the "line of the Arga, and in conjunction with the "cavalry of the Ribera, (on the Arga), check or "pursue any predatory column of the rebels that "should attempt to pass the lower Ebro, &c. "Thus, with the force at Vittoria or Miranda, and "in the Ribera, there would remain a movable "column of at least fourteen battalions (or sixteen), "and nearly 2000 cavalry,* to defend the Ebro, "Castile," &c.—But as the Queen's army had now to guard a circumference of nearly 200 miles with a disposable force, but little superior, even when united, to that of the enemy, it was, in fact, impossible for it to prevent the exit at some point or other, of so strong and efficient an expedition as that which now accompanied the Pretender.

We should not close, however, the notice of these operations so near the frontier, without an expression of thanks for the prompt, kind, and humane as-

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* This was an over-estimate of the disposable cavalry.

sistance given to the Queen's troops by the French civil and military authorities. While the contest was going on before Irun, hospital quarters, surgical aid, and every requisite were offered and accepted for the wounded on the allied territory. The collection of provisions was also facilitated; and on its being intimated that our cannon ammunition might run short, the caissons of a French battery were immediately despatched for our use, in case of need, from Bayonne. But, above all, are our acknowledgments due to the officer commanding the French forces on the Pyrenees,—one whose name holds a brilliant place in the military records of his country,—and who, in his later career, has won additional esteem and honour—by the generous, amiable, and enlightened views which distinguish his personal and political conduct.*

But we must here revert for a moment to the memorial of the prisoners of Irun to the Pretender. It contained an acknowledgment of the admirable forbearance of the soldiery in yielding to the injunctions of their officers to save the lives of their enemies.

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* The Austrian ambassador, *Count Appony*, is said to have remonstrated with the KING LOUIS PHILIPPE, on the conduct of *Count Harispe*, but was assured by his Majesty, that if he were removed, his presence in the Chamber of Peers might be yet more inconvenient.

It appears that the enemy granted a reward to those who made prisoners from the Legion. They were not, however, very successful in this object; since, altogether, only 47 in the two years fell into their hands;—consisting of men who may have incautiously gone beyond their lines, been laid in wait for and entrapped, missed their road, or were, by fatigue, sickness, or otherwise, separated from their comrades, &c. The whole of these suffered death under the Durango Decree. Even the highest rank among the Carlists appear to have been wholly unaware of the responsibility of ministering to so cowardly and detestable a purpose.—Here is an instance:—Three dismounted and unarmed Lancers, while searching for forage for their horses, near Vittoria, were seized on by some villagers and two or three Carlist soldiers.—On this, their commander-in-chief, writes and publishes the following despatch:—

"Excellent Sir,

"I have received the following despatch "from General Don Bruno Villa Real, dated yes- "terday:—'This morning I sent out a detachment "of cavalry on a reconnoitring party, in the direc- "tion of the fields of Salvatierra, and the environs "of Vittoria. Two soldiers, belonging to the "Lancers of Biscay, whose names are Juan Bautista "Arostoguira, and De Moya, actually advanced to "the gates of Vittoria, and, although only armed

" with their swords, made four* English Lancers " prisoners, who *will this day be shot.*—You will " be pleased to make their extraordinary brave con- " duct known to his Majesty, and entreat that the " *soldiers may receive the bounty of one real per day* " *for the rest of their lives,* &c.'

" COUNT DE CASA EGUIA."

The shooting of the prisoners is thus alluded to as a matter of course. Unfortunately this was not all. The victims were invariably given up for some hours, sometimes for one or two days, to be wantonly tortured or mutilated by those who might feel so disposed, before their sufferings were ended. Of this there were too many proofs.—" Their deaths," (says the best account that has appeared on the subject†—speaking of one of these instances)— " were even more horrible, if horror could be in- " creased, than those that have been mentioned be- " fore. They were tied to trees, and fires of green " wood kindled, that would not burn too soon, nor " extinguish life speedily:—the Carlist soldiers " amusing themselves by throwing cartridges into " the fire, exploding them about the tortured

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* Three, as reported to us.

† *Somerville.*—This author's conduct and character with the Legion were those of a most respectable and praiseworthy non-commissioned officer.

" wretches. And while such inhuman barbarity " was the almost daily exercise of the Carlist execu- " tioners:—the correspondents of newspapers on " that side withheld information of such monstrous " cruelty.

" At this very time some English newspapers " contained accounts of 130 Carlists having been " put to death in cold blood, by the Legion.

" Even this came before Parliament for discus- " sion, and was gravely asserted on the authority " of these correspondents, by Lord Londonderry. " So far from that being true, the Legion at this " time, had never taken a prisoner;—nor up to the " time of being disbanded and returning to this " country, was it ever known that a Spaniard had " been slain by one of the Legion, excepting in the " open field of fight."*

We are not aware of any modern examples of such avowed violations of humanity as those referred to,—not arising in the exasperations of conflict,—but perpetrated with deliberation, with

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* Of three unarmed men of the 6th regiment, who were seized on by a party in ambush, while collecting firewood,— " One of them died in about an hour, having bled to death. " Another prayed to be put out of pain, six hours after his " fingers and toes had been cut off: and the third, (supposed to " be M'Gregor, from the description of his person), was still " lingering the second day, having been upwards of forty hours " tied to the post in the public green, outside of Hernani gate." There are other instances that will not bear recital.

official formalities, and by an authority whose pretensions were aided, or whose armies were actually subsidized by several European Cabinets, and by a powerful body of public men in England!

Of the disclaimers on this point, occasionally made, much need not be said, as every one knows their import and value.

The Auxiliaries fought in the same field, with Spanish and British national troops,—but *they* alone were subject (and with scarcely a voice being raised in its reprobation) to this savage treatment.—Without some influential or powerful interposition, there was no probable mode of checking, or putting an end to it, except by reprisals at least as sanguinary,—for acts of mercy were not taken the least notice of. But such a course, however justifiable and necessary, if our services had been to continue till the end of the war, would,—under the circumstances, have been abhorrent to both men and officers; and they also well knew that if resorted to, it would have been instantly denounced and held up to execration by those very persons who readily palliated or kept out of view, the conduct which provoked it.*

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* Thus it was, when General Van Halen resorted to retaliations;—and yet, by doing so, he materially checked the effusion of blood.

It must be acknowledged, that these barbarities were not without influence on the operations. In assaults of a desperate or doubtful nature—on the slightest retrograde movement—the troops unavoidably felt, that if wounded and left on the ground, they incurred a fate unusual between civilized nations,—that of an ignominious and lingering death,—in fact, far worse than that of a culprit;—accompanied also by the reflection, that their fall, instead of being regretted or honoured, would, with many, be only a signal for additional taunt or aspersion.

These considerations may possibly have been part of the motives which determined some to retire from the service. And the Commander of the Auxiliaries felt it a duty to shape such movements as depended exclusively on himself, so as to involve the least risk of leaving detached parties, wounded, or stragglers, in the power of so cruel an enemy.

Formerly, when a British subject was outraged in any way in a foreign land, meetings, motions in Parliament, appeals to Government on the subject, were but the ordinary expressions of the public indignation. No such indication took place in our behalf.

And though this could not deprive us of the consciousness of supporting, to the spirit and letter of our engagement, and with our best exertions, a great and just cause,—it still led to the deep and

painful conviction, that (whether from the reckless misrepresentations of our enemies, the lukewarmness of friends, or the remarkable indifference generally existing for the last few years on all matters regarding foreign policy) we had not the support and sympathy we were entitled to hope for.

On the 18th (May), Fontarabia, as stated, capitulated;—on the 21st the Auxiliaries returned to Hernani; and on the 29th escorted for a few leagues the General-in-Chief, on the march of the army to Navarre.—The road by which the column moved, unavoidably passed for a short distance near the Orio river. The enemy had thrown up an entrenchment on the opposite bank, from whence they maintained with impunity a galling fire on our column. General Gurrea, commanding one of the divisions of the Christino army, an extremely gallant and experienced officer, was killed. The river was unfordable. There was no means of getting rid of the annoyance but by cannon fire. But the enemy were so well covered, that round shot did not disturb them. On the Legion Artillery* however, opening with shrapnell shells—in ten minutes they were driven out of their entrenchment, and put to flight.

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* For the decided efficiency of this arm, with the Auxiliaries, we were chiefly indebted to the great assistance granted us, by the Master-General of the Ordnance, Sir Hussey Vivian, and to the talent of Lieut.-Colonel Colquhoun, of the Royal Artillery.

At this period occurred a memorable event—one of far greater moment than any action of the war—the promulgation of the "CONSTITUTION OF 1837."—Whether this project be destined to undergo modification,—or is sufficiently in unison with the state of society, property, and the long-established municipal institutions of the country, which latter form so important an element and groundwork of the representative system, are questions which foreigners should at least be diffident, in attempting to solve.—But that it has appeared to conciliate an auspicious degree of general assent, leading to the inference that it will remain the basis of the future government, may safely be affirmed.—It resembles in form, but is considerably more popular in some of its provisions, than that of France or England.

In the Senate or Peerage, the principle of election has been partially admitted. On the electoral body the comprehensive functions devolve, of choosing an assembly for the conduct of local or provincial affairs;—of electing the deputies or members of the House of Commons; and of presenting a triple list of persons eligible for the Senate, from which the Crown selects a third, to constitute that branch of the Legislature. The Ballot is adopted.—Senators must be above 40, Deputies above 25 years of age;—special qualifications being requisite. The Cortes, consisting of the Senate and Congress (or

Commons), is triennial, with the power of dissolution in the Crown. But on the assembling of a new Cortes, only one-third of the Senators (retiring in rotation by seniority) are renewed.

The character and proceedings of this Chamber are understood to have given less cause of dissatisfaction to the aristocratic party than might have been anticipated. It may not have the stability, and cannot possess the irresponsible power of an hereditary institution. But neither can a froward portion of its members set at defiance the wants, wishes, and convictions of the people:—nor stop the ordinary course of legislation, to coerce or intimidate the Sovereign in the selection of responsible servants. In point of property, the Grandees of Spain are, in proportion, scarcely inferior to the nobility of England. And though it be true that from the splendid qualities, services, and even virtues of many of those of whom the English Peerage is composed, it may be considered to present an imposing aspect, it is no less true that its proceedings for the last few years have been but little calculated to encourage imitation.

Be this as it may, the Spanish Senate, though originating, under certain restrictions, with the people,—has evinced a tendency to support the Executive, without creating odium, and so to check the possibly too rapid or popular action of the Commons;—whether in a wholesome degree, time or the prevailing opinion must determine.

The liberty of the press is recognized, subject only, in cases of offence, to the verdict of a jury.—But there is no part of this Constitution more worthy of note than the brief reference it contains to the affairs of the Church, viz. "The nation obliges "itself to maintain the worship and the ministers "of the Catholic religion, which the Spanish people "profess." Thus a State religion is constituted, but with the honourable distinction of being unaccompanied by the slightest intolerance or penal disability;—it being enacted,—"That all Spaniards "are admissible to offices and public employments, "according to their merit and capacity."

This was the work of a Legislature convened in a time of profound excitement, civil war, and the fiercest clash of interests and classes—circumstances singularly unfavourable to that calm discernment and foresight of the general welfare, desirable for so momentous a task:—and yet it certainly afforded this rare proof of moderation and augury of stability, that the leaders of the lately defeated rival section of public men, many of whom had retired, on the fall of the Isturiz Ministry, to France — immediately recognized, swore to it, and returned to take part in the national affairs.

The form and organic principles thus laid down, were voted by large majorities, in the Cortes of 1837, and during the CALATRAVA Ministry

Against those principles no voice has at all events yet been raised. Even subsequent ministries, accused of designs of a subversive tendency, have generally deemed it right to reiterate their declarations of adhesion. And as to the violent state of contention now reported in some of the public prints to have arisen in consequence of the late dissolution and approaching elections,—to our apprehension it at least proves that the country is to be ruled, through a parliamentary majority, and that the representative principle is taking root and establishing itself.

With respect, however, to the writer of this sketch,—though entertaining warm hopes and anticipations as to the permanence of this settlement,—he deemed it both a point of honour—and his imperative duty as a foreigner, to whom an important trust was confided,—not to presume on the remotest interference between the two Constitutional parties:—his part being limited to that of opposing the pure unqualified despotism it was sought to restore;—and in which he was acting conformably with the laws and policy, and in conjunction with the forces, of his own country.

The last action engaged in by any part of the Legion was a very brilliant one — by the 2nd Lancers under Colonel Jacks. This small corps, reduced to 80 effective horses, had been detached,

to assist in the defence of the plain of Vittoria; and on the occasion referred to, formed part of a column commanded by Colonel Don Martin Zurbano, an officer of great enterprise. The English Lancers were moving at the head of this column of 1500 men, engaged in one of Zurbano's usual excursions into the enemy's quarters, when suddenly two Carlist battalions were discovered retiring, but too distant to be overtaken by the Christino Infantry. Being pursued by the Lancers, the Carlists halted, deployed, and delivered their fire; but the former charged with resolution, secured 120 prisoners, killed a still larger number, and totally dispersed the remainder.

The 10th of June, 1837, now approached.—This completed the two years for which the Auxiliaries had engaged to serve in Spain.—It was also the period at which the permission granted by the original Order in Council expired, and the men were therefore no longer liable to military law, nor had the officers any power or authority over them; the arms, ammunition, &c. were consequently delivered into store.

This, in a mere military sense, was to be regretted, for we were all beginning to be acquainted with our business; and should probably, had it been practicable to keep the corps* together during another cam-

* Still present or detached, 3800 effectives—infantry, cavalry,

paign,—have been as capable of the more difficult operations of war, as any regular national force whatever.

A new enlistment had been earnestly proposed, but to which, from various causes, the utmost disinclination existed. Scanty payments, provided the confidence of the Soldier be not shaken, may be easily contended with. But without magazines in some tolerable proportion,—especially in an insurgent hostile territory, where every post that is recovered or occupied requires to be fortified,—neither security in defence, the *morale* of the troops, nor any progress in operations is to be counted on.

The provisioning the *corps d'armée* in question, may be thus briefly described. The Contractors were French and Spanish Merchants, they were paid by bills at various dates, on Madrid, Bayonne, Bourdeaux, &c. If these were not duly honoured as too often happened on their successive presentation for payment, the usual process was to announce to the General in command, that they could no longer supply the troops, unless their bills were

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and artillery, but with only 230 horses for both arms, not having received any remounts.—There were also about 2000 wounded, sick, or non-effective.—Total, of all ranks then in Spain, nearly 6000.—Died in the field or in hospital, 2700; by the Durango Decree, 47.—Total, killed, wounded, and deaths, 4000.—Besides a very large number sent home originally unfit for service, mutineers, deserters, invalids, &c.

immediately paid. By this means they compelled the General to ply the Government with incessant remonstrances in their behalf.

To secure the working of this ingenious system, the contractors kept such depots as they had collected within the French frontier* (beyond the reach therefore of any military control), and from whence they transported to us by sea in open boats, barely enough to provide for two or three days at a time. For it was essential to their apparent object to keep the troops continually on the brink of want. The tract of country we occupied, though usually most prolific and highly cultivated, at this time yielded nothing, —having been so often fought over and being still a scene of contest, every thing upon it was in ruin.

The sea also, then our only line of communication, is frequently in the winter so tempestuous on this dangerous coast, as to render its navigation at times, for two or three weeks together, impracticable.—On one occasion during a storm (December, 1836), we had arrived at the last issue of rations, and were only saved from the worst consequences, by a vessel freighted with rice and fish bound to Catalonia, being opportunely driven in and wrecked in the bay.—So that, with an implacable enemy in front, the sea occasionally unnavigable to the rear, and a soldiery (from penury and want) verging on mutiny,

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* At St. Jean de Luz.

— our contingent prospect at that period was to the utmost degree unsatisfactory.

To have advanced, with a view of taking possession of the enemy's supplies, did not promise extrication from this dilemma, for they in fact did not require magazines, being fed daily from the neighbouring communes, who, through good will or fear of punishment, regularly brought to the quarters of the Carlist troops* their quotas of contribution— but who, on the approach of a Christino column, were yet more prompt to carry off to their fastnesses or conceal every thing useful to the royal troops. This, in a country so difficult to penetrate and by a population habituated at intervals during 30 years to warfare, was easily done.

Nearly 300 officers had retired on various grounds;—200 had been killed, wounded or disabled;† and of those who originally joined us, there remained only 35 for regimental duty. Of course, the places of those who had retired or fallen were partly filled up by others. But this, (amongst other consequences destructive to organization,) caused a constant change in the command of regiments, companies, &c. The recollections, also, of the harassing and rigorous nature of the service during the past inclement winters,

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* The chief part of whom, were the sons, brothers, or nearest relatives of those who supplied them.

† Lost by sickness, 60 officers.

tended to increase the desire of the soldiers to return to their own country.

Still however the government of the Queen Regent urged — "most anxiously the re-engage-"ment of the Legion," expressing "their confi-"dence that the officer in command would assist "this object by every means in his power,—for "they" (the Government, as observed)—"justly "considered that the departure of the Legion at "this moment would be one of the worst events "that could befall the Queen's cause."

To promote this object, above £30,000. was transmitted to the corps, as an instalment on the arrears.

However desirous the officer referred to was, to give effect to wishes thus expressed and supported, still—after the experience he had had of the difficulty of keeping a foreign force together under the peculiar circumstances of the war, he could hardly permit himself to anticipate the success of the intention of Government.

Eventually, some weeks after his departure, by great exertions, additionally favourable stipulations, the payment of a new bounty, &c. about 1100 men were persuaded to re-enlist.—These were called the "New Legion,"* and were commanded by a

* The only action a part of this small force appears to have been engaged in, was that at *Andoin*,—in which the Spanish General O'Donnel commanded, and where about 100 men and

very efficient officer, Col. O'Connell,—but with the exception of about 350, they all, (officers and men) laid down their arms, in a few months—from the old cause, want of supplies. The remaining 350 (artillery and lancers) continued in Spain, commanded by Col. De Lassaussai; and have conducted themselves in a very distinguished manner on various subsequent occasions, even up to the present time.

The history of the French Legion and the termination of their service, were almost identically similar to those of the British force,—although the former were already an experienced and well disciplined corps of the French Army,—with the advantage denied to their British comrades, of being treated with the candour, fairness, and regard to facts,— Soldiers had a right to expect from the military or political parties of their own country.*

On the expiration of the two years' service, before mentioned (June, 1837),—the writer of this statement returned to England; having executed the duty he had undertaken,—according to his best exertions and the means placed at his disposal.

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officers, having been separated from the other troops with whom they were acting, and the greater part being wounded, were *refused quarter.*

* "The French Legionaries" (says a despatch of Sarsfield, 11th of February, 1837), "refuse to obey their officers.—They "have declared that—'Leur aversion pour le service de L'Espagne "est arrivée au plus hout degrêe.'"

But instead of a strong corps of 10,000 men which had been calculated on,—from 4500 to 5000 sabres and bayonets, was the utmost of the actual British force it had been in his power to bring into the field. The means also of maintaining the real efficiency of this smaller number, falling short in a yet more decided proportion.

Assailed as his conduct was, in the performance of this duty—he may perhaps be pardoned in briefly alluding to some of the expressions of approval, conveyed through a high channel, from those under whom he acted:—"The Government are unvarying to me in their expressions of high esteem and gratitude towards you." . . . . "I cannot give you a better proof of it, than the number of times the different members of the Cabinet have expressed to me their desire" . . . . . , . . . "and I am sure that no sacrifice would have been thought great in order to retain you in the Queen's service upon any conditions you liked to impose." . . . . . "Her Majesty's Government are truly grateful for all your services, and dread the consequences of your going. I have been asked over and over again, whether I thought there was any command that could be given to you, or in short any inducement offered in order that you might prolong your stay in this country.—I have said I thought it was impossible, but I communicate them for the mere chance of

" your being able to stay beyond the 10th of June."
" — Towards yourself I assure you that there
" exists a sincere feeling of gratitude on the part
" of the Government, collectively and individually,
" and the desire that you should remain is as great
" and if possible greater, than at any time since you
" came to this country; —but I have held out no
" hopes to them of this, because I fear that your
" determination is irrevocably taken."

He was honoured with other and even more kind and earnest expressions of the good opinion entertained towards him,—but which are unnecessary to quote.

And truly sensible as he was of the generous conduct he had experienced in Spain, and above all from the generals, officers, and soldiers with whom he had acted,—it was with a deep feeling of regret that he found it impossible to postpone any longer, his departure for England; — amongst the most positive causes of which, was the express and unequivocal condition he had entered into with his constituents, of returning at the time which had now arrived, to his duty in Parliament, an unqualified promise, which could not have been violated without a sacrifice of public character.

" Had he," (said the gallant member for Launceston—referring to the period of sickness at Vittoria)
" been in the situation of General Evans, no conduct
" should have prevented him from leading back

" the troops to England, to rescue them from the " sufferings they were subject to," &c.*

Had General Evans done any such thing, he would have been guilty of desertion, and justly liable to the penalty a Court-martial might impose. The gallant member, to have entertained this idea, must have been under the impression, sedulously inculcated, and which formed one of the most unjust annoyances to which the individual alluded to was subjected—namely, that he had entered into a contract with the Spanish Government for the service of this body of troops,—that he was therefore responsible for their payment, food, clothing,† &c. or with the power, at least, of withdrawing them, in the case of non-fulfilment.—But nothing of the sort existed.

The simple fact was this—the Government of Spain, with the permission of that of England, determined on raising this force. After which, a command in the Spanish army, to include these Auxiliaries, was offered to the individual who accepted it,—and which placed him merely in the situation of a Spanish General, with certain additional duties.—And if he had not accepted it,—a Tory officer might perhaps have done so,—when

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* As reported in the Debates.

† The slight foundation for which was—that he had signed a certificate, affirming the correctness of a printed copy of the conditions offered for enlistment by the Spanish Government.

some, at least, of the obstacles tending to destroy the usefulness of the corps, would probably never have arisen.

He did, however, consider it his duty to acquaint the Government repeatedly, of his inability (with the means granted him), to maintain the effective state of the troops,—and to suggest his readiness to yield his office to any one they might select—more capable of doing so, of more talent, and towards whom the same hostility in England might not exist.—But these offers of retiring, before the expiration of the service, were invariably met from the highest quarters by the most earnest deprecations,—as for instance—"Were you to carry "such intention into effect, (we) do not hesitate to "say that it would be the heaviest blow the Queen's "cause has yet received, and the greatest victory "the Carlists have gained or will gain. It would "be a triumph to that party, both here and in "England, such as (we) shrink from the contem-"plation of,—as well as of all the political conse-"quences it would have," &c.—Other and yet more explicit adjurations were received to the same effect.—A great portion of the officers and troops would also, as was expected, have vehemently objected to his withdrawing, unless they also were free to do so,—and it was feared the corps might have broken up.—But his duty, in this respect—was thus fulfilled.

To the Auxiliary officers, the possibility of being

eventually obliged to resort to reprisals for the Durango Decree, was a painful and revolting anticipation, already noticed; while to the soldiers, the fate which they knew had awaited with impunity several of their comrades (being themselves restrained from retaliation), was a deep-felt source of irritation.

It was well known—(and to the injury of discipline)—that if the commander of the Legion executed capital punishments, the question was probably to be raised as to his legal power, and a prosecution for murder commenced, with a view of casting a stigma on his character.—The utter absence of gentlemanly feeling which distinguished much of the proceedings against him, at the ensuing Westminster election, leaves little doubt of this intention being carried into effect.—Fortunately no atrocious crimes were committed by the Legion—and happily therefore no capital punishment was necessary.—Of what other corps can the same be said?

But the main cause of the mutinies in the Legion—the arrears of pay*—and even yet more, the extreme distrust as to their liquidation, and the doubts of the payment of pensions for loss of limbs, &c. had continued to the last, and might unavoidably lead to a recurrence of open indiscipline,—ac-

* About £280,000.—The inferior ranks, then about five months in arrears,—officers from seven to ten months,—superior officers (including the chief of the force) from twelve to fifteen months.

companied by outrages of such magnitude as to have left the responsible officer scarcely any alternative, but that of incurring the risk of the harassing prosecutions with which he was menaced. This will be admitted to have been a severe and peculiar dilemma!

We have said that no offences of enormity were committed by the Auxiliaries. If the fact, however, were otherwise; if they were really guilty of the atrocities so copiously attributed to them —the old Peninsular officers ought at least to have known better than to have sanctioned these charges,—since so many unpleasant recollections might have been cited in extenuation;—and on the undeniable authority of the great chief of the army—who repeatedly describes the conduct of his men, as "*infamous*,"—"*disgraceful*,"—"*enormous*,"—that "*perjury* was as common as *robbery* and *murder*,"—that they were becoming "*little better than a band of robbers*,"—finally, declaring that he *had it not in his power to prevent* these disorders.—And with regard to the consequences of deficient pay, the following may be adduced,—"I am rather inclined to attribute their misbeha-"viour to the misery and consequent indifference "of both officers and soldiers, on account of their "want of pay."*

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* Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool.

† Despatches, 1812.

No more then need be said on these points—so much was but just towards the Soldiers of the Legion.

The attacks on the Auxiliaries gave occasion to many admirable speeches, for which those in whose vindication they were made, felt most grateful;—and of which the ability, just feeling, and statesman-like views, formed a striking contrast with the infinite and petty cavils brought forward by the opposition. But as we had the amplest privilege of British soldiers in respect to accusation—being treated, however, but as Spaniards or foreigners as to approval or reward,—so our enemies had the decided advantage over our friends, of choosing their own time, and never mooting the subject, except to exaggerate a reverse, or give effect, on however questionable authority, to unfavourable statements.

Of the military men who mixed in this discussion, the illustrious Head of the Army—for such he may be considered, whether in or out of office—and the Master-General of the Ordnance, were the only ones who have held any responsible commands. As to the former, who of course did not condescend in his strictures to the tone adopted by some others—the writer of this sketch having had the honour of serving for some five or six years under his orders, and participating in the universal respect entertained towards him,—would feel a reluctance in controverting, even in self-defence, and however easily in

this instance it might be done, any expressions dropped by his Grace. But this is the more unnecessary, since from the debates,—as for instance, that on the occurrences at Birmingham,—it is generally apparent that the Duke's observations, even on military topics, are occasionally tinged with a political bias.—Sir Hussey Vivian lost no opportunity of assisting the efficiency and protecting the reputation of the corps,—as was consistent with his independent principles, official duty, and the military knowledge and generosity of a soldier.

"In the House of Commons" (said Lord John Russell), "the chief effort of the so-called Con-
"servatives has been directed vainly to affix a mark
"of dishonour on their countrymen, gallantly con-
"tending in arms in a foreign land."

Such was the opinion of the leader of the majority of that House,—not delivered in the heat of debate, but deliberately in an address to his constituents,—by one not less elevated in position, than remarkable for sincerity and rectitude. We have not, therefore, been too sensitive in supposing this fact.—The effort, however, was not confined to the Commons, but extended far more widely.

We abstain from detail on the circumstances contributing to this end,—the mode of collecting and disseminating information which might be perverted to

the purpose,—the dissuasion of officers of merit from joining us,—the inducements to others to leave us,—the encouragement of those who might be disposed to impugn the service, their comrades or commander, &c. &c. all which tending to cripple the corps, and so, it was obviously calculated, to the discredit of the Ministry, by whom its formation had been sanctioned!—The chief object proposed being doubtless the return of this party to power,—but the means by which it was to be accomplished were surely the most paltry and unworthy ever used in political warfare.

The war in the northern provinces was by no means the only or most perilous one, which was going on in Spain. That between the Moderados and Exaltados, was also raging at Madrid. The consequence was, that twice during our service, the powers of the Government were almost annulled, the country narrowly escaping a total anarchy.—Had this species of interregnum in either instance continued,—the situation of an officer charged with the command, and in some degree with the subsistence, of a large body of foreigners, might have been almost inextricable. —The personal responsibility which it was pretended belonged to him, must have then rendered his post additionally irksome.—And this was a state of things against the recurrence of which it was impossible to provide.

"Dissatisfaction on one subject," (as was justly observed), "begets it on others, and I should have "(indeed I may say I have, for the first time) the "pain of commanding a dissatisfied army."— "This constraint naturally excites a temper ready "to receive any impressions which will create dis- "satisfaction; and *where dissatisfaction exists in an "army, the task of the commander is difficult indeed.*"*

If a consummate captain, of the most energetic qualities,—backed by the wealth, powers and credit of the British Treasury and Government,—acting amidst a devotedly friendly population and priesthood, and with the best organised troops of Europe —should have been thus inconvenienced by privations,—surely the Spanish officers, and especially those of the immature and imperfectly constituted Auxiliaries,—destitute of all the above advantages, might have claimed a more just consideration, if they also found their task, from similar but more aggravated causes, of an embarrassing nature!

War has been not inaptly described as the art of surmounting difficulties. This at least applies where any proportion exists between the opposing forces. The reader will judge whether they were not, in this case, more than usually accumulated. —With regard to the protraction of the contest generally,—it is chiefly to be traced to the

* *Despatches.*—To the Right Hon. John Villiers.

financial embarrassments of Spain, the imperfect fulfilment of the Quadruple Treaty by France, and the pecuniary subsidies furnished to the rebels from Foreign States.

The obstacles the Auxiliaries had essentially to contend with—were, the inability of the Regent's government to afford the means indispensable for offensive operations,—the severe and effective discountenance of the corps by the three great military influences of our own country, (the King,* the Duke of Wellington, the Commander-in-Chief,)†—and the unceasing unscrupulous hostility of the Conservative opposition.

But we had also great advantages,—and these consisted in the extraordinary zeal and exertion; the enterprising and fearless spirit: the good feeling, and constancy of the great majority of the officers and soldiers composing the force;—qualities, without which it could not have remained embodied for half the period of its duration; and

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* His Majesty had granted his full sanction, both of the corps and the individual selected to command it. But means were subsequently found to convince him of the expediency of withholding from this force all that depended on the Royal pleasure or prerogative.

† All precedent was deviated from, in reference to the Legion.

to vindicate which has been a chief motive for the narrative attempted in these pages.

The Queen's forces serving in Guipuscoa, between May 1836 and June 1837, consisted of Spanish and Legionary troops,—generally in about equal numbers. Their total loss in killed and wounded has been stated at about 5,000—that of the enemy estimated at considerably more. The Legion, (though wholly inexperienced,—embodied, drilled, and instructed, from the first moment of its formation in the presence of the enemy)—never lost, in its various actions, the smallest portion of its artillery, equipage, or the least picket or section of its ranks to the rebels,—having on the other hand shared with their Spanish comrades in the capture of 100 officers, 1000 men, 30 pieces of cannon, 5 fortified towns or posts, the only sea port in the Pretender's possession,* and in restoring to the Queen's authorities a district of about fifty miles circumference, which, though not extensive, was incomparably the most important of all the insurgent territory.

The Legion did not, it is true, put an end to the civil war, then sustained by about 70,000† mountaineers, restricted however for the most part to the defence of their own gorges and fastnesses. But we

* Passages.—Fontarabia is also a port, but not for ships of war.

† Catalonians, Lower Arragonese, Basques.

venture to assert, that in the opinions of the Spanish people and Government, (and no less so of the Carlists)—who after all must be the most impartial judges,—this small force rendered, at one of the most critical junctures for the eventual triumph of Constitutional principles in the country, an honest, gallant, and highly useful auxiliary support.

And as to the ridiculous or disingenuous attempts to disparage it, by contrasting or comparing its conduct or service, with the operations of great armies, under the most fortunate auspices and most transcendent leaders—a course of remark commenced even before time was afforded for putting arms into the hands of these recruits—we leave them,—(together with a variety of other petty, wanton, or groundles sstatements of the same character)—totally unnoticed and to the contempt they will probably be found to merit.

We shrink not, however, should our critics be disposed to pursue the subject, from any comparisons it may be desired to institute, between the services in question and those of any other independent *corps d'armée*, of any thing like similar numbers, or under any thing approaching to similar circumstances.

With respect to the policy of suspending the Foreign Enlistment Act, we have already shewn

that it was the direct and sole cause of the existence, not only of the British, but of the French and Portuguese Legions. We have no right to conclude that the assistance rendered by the two latter corps was not equally effective with that of the former.

Thus was a co-operation procured of about 18,000 men, besides a great moral and political effect. It commenced when the Constitutional forces were (from a series of previous defeats) in a condition of extreme numerical feebleness and discouragement. It continued for nearly two years, affording valuable time for recruiting the strength and *morale* of the national army—thus powerfully and opportunely contributing to avert from the whole Peninsula, probably far greater evils (and of much longer continuance) than those which have been endured.—These then, it is contended, without the fear of any rational contradiction, are the practical results of the suspension of the law alluded to.

And yet it was in the face of such palpable facts—Parliament was in 1838, invited to affirm, by politicians assuming to be particularly conversant with such subjects,—that the policy of the British Cabinet was, on this point, of no avail and no utility to the Spanish cause!—This proposition came to an untimely but appropriate end—its supporters, though numerous, being, by some ludicrous mis-

chance, either not present or not ready, at the beginning of the second night's debate,—to commence their speeches.

This was the last grand and (it may be added) abortive attempt to pass a Parliamentary censure on the present conduct of our Foreign affairs ;—than which no portion of ministerial policy has been more vehemently assailed ;—nor has any department more invariably foiled its adversaries. But the ardour of animadversion on this head will probably subside,—as a consequence of the conspicuous successes of the policy alluded to.

These, or at least the results, (if we may deviate for a moment from the narrative), may be thus mentioned: viz. the continued maintenance of peace, —repression of foreign encroachment, as exemplified in the late brilliant expedition into Central Asia,—and the attainment of popular institutions, encouraged by zealous British aid,—for no less than four nations, — Greece, Portugal, Belgium, and Spain.

Above all, has the emancipation from arbitrary rule in the latter and most important instance, been most perseveringly contributed to, against all obstacles and obloquy,—by the Noble Lord who directs with such eminent ability, the foreign department of this country.

The above are great results, bearing honourable comparison, both in spirit and extent, with those of any period of our diplomatic history, even with that of a Canning, or a Chatham,—offering, no doubt, ample provocation, for the hostility of all Anti-Reformers;—and which,—the writer may be permitted to observe, (in reference to those to whom this memorandum is addressed), additionally assure him, that in assisting, by his humble and best efforts, the measures for carrying out these objects—he has been only fulfilling a duty, and giving effect to the principles, which have so long characterised the great and enlightened constituency who have honoured him by their choice.

About a month after the Legion had left Spain, peculiar discontents arose amongst the Queen's troops remaining in the Basque Provinces. Amongst the means employed for misleading the soldiery, was that of creating suspicion of the good faith of their chiefs towards the Constitutional cause.

It is important to observe, that the Spanish army, but more especially the non-commissioned officers and soldiers,—are decided Liberals. And it was the knowledge of this fact, which has always convinced us, that, under whatever circumstances, the restoration of the old regime in Spain was completely impossible.

Mutinies of whole battalions broke out at the period referred to, and almost simultaneously, in the principal stations of the army. At Miranda, General Excalera, a gallant and valuable officer, fell by the hands of the mutineers; as also the Governor and four principal officers at Vitoria,—and General Sarsfield at Pamplona. At Hernani, Generals Count Mirasol and Reudon, narrowly escaped the same fate, having been shot at, wounded, and obliged to fly.—The mutineers even got possession of Pamplona.—Order was however partially restored.

The Carlist expedition, which left the Basque Provinces on the 20th May, was compelled to make a circuitous march through a considerable part of the kingdom, during which it had several severe actions with the Queen's forces.

In Northern Arragon, the peasantry, who are staunch Constitutionalists, hung upon their rear, ready, in case of disaster, to assist in their destruction. In the mountains of Catalonia their reception was not favourable. They passed into the districts of Cabrera,—which were incapable of supporting them,—and thence into Castile, where they were augmented by another column from the Provinces, making the total expeditionary forces, 16,000 effective infantry, and 1200 horse.

The Pretender during this progress, approached

to within two leagues of Madrid, where, though an open town, there was no want of confidence, or disloyal feeling evinced. Its garrison consisted of about 10,000 National Guards, considered to surpass in equipment, appearance, and instruction, even those of Paris.—The Queen Regent did all that depended on her to sustain the proper feeling,—appeared, as usual, without guards, in the principal places of the capital,—presented herself to the troops,—went with an escort to the neighbouring heights, from whence to view the enemy's army, &c. The confidence placed by her Majesty, on this and many other occasions of peril, in the respect and affection of her people, was not misplaced. Amidst all the jarrings of faction, none but the most kindly feelings have been exhibited by all parties towards the Regent. To this, her perfect equanimity, and the most remarkable graciousness of deportment, doubtless contributed. But the existence of this feeling, in a war of succession, formed no inconsiderable element of reliance to her Government.

The General-in-Chief had been called from the *Ebro* to the defence of *Castile.* On his arrival the enemy rapidly retreated. Near *Aranda de Douero* he routed, and drove them into the mountains of Soria. Here Espartero interposed between the two columns of five or six thousand each, into which the remains of the enemy had separated, with one of which was *Don Carlos,* the other commanded by *Don Sebastian.*

Don Sebastian, with *Zariateque*, *Villa Real*, and other Generals, who were subsequently placed in arrest—fled into *Biscay*, abandoning the *Pretender* to such fate as might await him.

The troops of the latter wandered for some days, half clothed, ill fed, almost shoeless,—after which, by the intricacy of the forests of the Sierra, and rapid night marches, they escaped Espartero's pursuit, and again took refuge, but in a miserable and mutinous state, on the other side of the Ebro.

This expedition, which it was generally expected must have terminated in the ruin of the rebel cause, was at all events very disastrous,—but its most satisfactory result was, that in a transit of nearly a thousand miles, Don Carlos experienced not the smallest demonstration in his favour from any part of the population of town or country, not previously possessed by his partizans.

Espartero, destitute of the means of continuing the pursuit into the Basque fastnesses, now occupied himself in reorganizing the army, which he very properly began, by shooting the murderers of Excalera, Sarsfield, &c.—cashiering or inflicting other punishments on the leaders of each rank during the late mutinies.—This conduct, which was commented on at the time, was indispensable, and reflected credit on the sound judgment and courage, by which it was dictated.

In the following year, 1838, expeditions on a smaller scale, were again attempted by the enemy, but with still less success, —one of them of 5000 men, having been entirely captured or destroyed by Espartero.* But the failure in this year of the siege of *Morella*, seriously retarded the war.

For the period between the autumn of 1837 and January, 1839, the Queen's forces continued in their usual helpless state as to magazines, equipment and means of transport.

In January, 1839, favourable changes occurred. General Alaix, a remarkably honest and firm man, thoroughly acquainted with the material wants of the armies, and but little, if at all, connected with political party, was appointed Minister of War,— with the understanding of not being removed, in the case of ordinary ministerial changes. The consequences of this arrangement, which gave the necessary stability and strength to the war department, were soon felt. Thus it was, that at the opening of the campaign the army was in a far superior state of efficiency than at any preceding period,—the General-in-Chief, at the same time, possessing for the first time in this war, three months' provisions, actually collected in his magazines,—and the operations being therefore

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* Letter of Lieut. Lynn, Royal Engineers, Assist. Mil. Commissioner, a highly intelligent and efficient officer.

at length rescued from dependance on the promises of contractors. The resources of the enemy had been on the other hand rapidly diminishing. Cut off from communication* with France, except by mountain tracks,—and the northern powers, having finally discovered that they had been applying their funds to no adequate purpose,—withheld about this period all further issue of the subsidies, by which, for the last three years, the contest had been mainly supported.

The campaign of 1839 opened by the victory of Guardamino, which deprived the enemy of several fortified points, with a large tract of country, and in which the chivalrous personal valour of the General-in-Chief was again conspicuous.

This was followed by the movement on Orduna, which, besides giving possession of that important place, turned the enemy's positions at Valmaceda —This again by the flank movement on Villa Real de Alava and Urquiola, which turned and rendered useless the strong fortifications erected by the enemy in front of Orduna. Both these operations were of high and admitted tactical skill.

The Queen's forces were now on the most lofty and commanding region of the insurgent country, the greater portion of which is in all seasons covered with snow, and whose almost inaccessible passes

* Since their loss of the great Irun line.

were for six years in the power of the Carlists. The enemy were discouraged and dismayed. The army descended towards BERGARA,—where the celebrated convention of that name followed,—by which 24 battalions of veterans laid down their arms, acknowledging allegiance to the Queen,—thus consummating an act of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peace,—in a cordial spirit, and under conditions completely honourable to both parties; and which afforded one of the most gratifying and remarkable instances of good sense and good feeling on the part of previously conflicting armies and opposing partizans, to be found in the records of any nation.

The Basque population and soldiery had become thoroughly tired of the war. The pretensions and yet more the person of the Pretender were fallen into the lowest estimation Various reasons convinced the men of most influence amongst them, that a successful issue was impossible. The desire of pacification was in short ardently and widely felt.—And that which above all facilitated it, was the entire confidence reposed by the Carlists in the good faith and high loyalty of character of the General-in-Chief of the Queen's army.

These were the immediate causes of this event; neither the intrigues of France, nor the gold of England had anything whatever to do with it. Nor

were individual officers other than instrumental in giving effect to the prevailing wish.

The conduct of the Duke of Victoria on this memorable occasion, won golden opinions for him in all quarters, and was above all praise. Never was a pure and comprehensive feeling of patriotism, more apparent.—Nor was the example he gave, of anxiety to obliterate every latent feeling of hostility, of his respect for the laws, the authority of the government, and integrity of the constitution, less admirable.—By whom has a victory been gained for his country,—more brilliant, useful, unalloyed?

The remainder of the Basque army dissolved, or fled with Don Carlos across the Pyrenees. The only feelings now understood to exist towards him in the late insurgent territory, are those of contempt or execration. This happily precludes the remotest chance of his banner being ever again unfurled by that brave people.

Thus has terminated the political career of the second Pretender to a Peninsular throne, who has had the advantage of being a cherished *protegé* of the English Tory or Conservative party!—Without this high protection, the British Cabinet would have been unshackled in the aid it was disposed to render to the Constitutionalists—the contests in Spain and Portugal must have been closed in less than half

the time they occupied,—and it is incalculable, the amount of misery, devastation, and blood, that would have been thus saved to those countries.

If the conduct observed on these questions, were depicted by an adequate pen, and conveyed as an index or test of the real sentiments of those alluded to, to the various constituencies of the kingdom, some public advantage might possibly be derived.

But we are unwilling to close these Memoranda, without offering a few remarks on the subject of the Spanish army.

It seems to have been a fashion with some English writers on the Peninsular war, to depreciate in the most unmeasured terms this army.* This has been particularly indulged in, by the most elaborate and eloquent of those writers, but who unquestionably labours under a most deplorable defect as an historian—that of the influence of violent partialities. We shall not stop to observe on the gratuitous exaggerations alluded to,—which, however, have prepared the British public for every unfavourable impression,—but will merely subjoin an opinion of the Duke of Wellington in connection with the subject, written during that war.†

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* From this we must except the History of Sir John Jones, R. E., which is clearly the best authority.

† "Besides, as I have above stated to your Lordship, the "Spanish troops do not want discipline, if by discipline is meant

We have described the extraordinary disadvantages under which the Queen's troops commenced this war. As to the period of its duration, it may be remarked that it also cost the North Americans seven years to emancipate themselves from a foreign yoke, —that France required nearly as long to pacify La Vendée.

But how is it,—it has been repeatedly asked,— that the Queen's army have not extinguished this rebellion?

How happens it, we reply, that the well organised Russian forces have not long since subdued the Circassians,—who maintain to this day, after many years, their native mountain positions, quite as triumphantly, if not more so, than the Carlists!

How happens it, that the admirable French army, now above 20 years in Africa, instead of having subdued the Arabs, sustain themselves at this moment with difficulty, by the help of some 20 entrenched camps or positions, which are in a state of blockade,—even to within half a dozen

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miles of the walls of Algiers! How was it that Mina, beginning with half-a-dozen, and ending with 13,000 men, was not put down (when acting for several years in these same provinces), by Napoleon's generals?

But the Spaniards, it will be rejoined, not only have not subdued the rebellion, but have suffered various defeats.—Was not one of the ablest of the French Marshals, two years since, signally defeated before Constantina? Did not the Circassians capture or destroy, last year, a whole Russian column of about 7000 men?—Did not the new levies of the United States, under Washington, capture two British armies, those of Burgoyne and the Marquis Cornwallis?—Let us look, however, to to La Vendée. There is an instance of what a fanatical popular force may do.—That rebellion broke out in 1793.

The French regular forces occupied a fortified camp at Saumur,—with 16,000 men, 100 cannon, redoubts, entrenchments, &c. 40,000 Vendeans attacked this camp, put the Republicans to flight, captured 80 cannon, 10,000 muskets, 11,000 prisoners.—Two months subsequently they destroyed the whole corps d'armée of General Westerman, taking 10,000 prisoners, and all his artillery. Soon after they defeated Kleber, who had 40,000 men,

taking a considerable part of his baggage. Next General Biron was defeated, with the loss of his artillery, and several thousand men. The Republicans now surrounded the Province with 200,000 men,—but the Insurgents occupied a central position, (as did the Carlists), and when in danger of being overpowered, passed into another province.—In six months, they had utterly routed six armies of 100,000 of the regular troops of France. And yet their positions were far inferior to those occupied by the Spanish Insurgents.—No disasters of this character were sustained by the Queen's arms.

Finally,—though foreigners have essentially aided the Queen's cause during an important period, still the Spanish National Army have now the satisfaction of bringing the contest to its present state without any greater extraneous assistance, than that of about 200 English Lancers, still remaining of the Legion.—Had it however been otherwise—there would have been nothing discreditable in it.—We ourselves owe, in a great degree, the expulsion of the pre-eminent Tory, James II. and settlement of our present liberties,—to the aid of a Dutch army of 14,000 men.—In like manner the North Americans to 7000 French troops, a battering train, and 30 sail of the line,—the Belgians, to a French army and British squadron. Even France, in 1815, received her Constitution, by the permission, under

sufferance,—of 500,000 foreigners, then occupying her territory.

The fact however, is, that the Spanish army has evinced great fortitude, great military and patriotic virtue, in holding together at all, under the wants, miseries, and distresses of all sorts, which they have endured in this long and arduous mountain warfare,—and yet more, therefore, in drawing it to a triumphant termination.—But in the next European war, under a Government of reasonable resource and stability, the qualities of the Spanish army will be better appreciated.

A remaining and ferocious band still linger, it is true, under the standard of superstition, on the mountain tops of Catalonia, and Lower Arragon—and will do so, until the melting of the snows (now literally the last protection of the rebels) shall permit the resumption of operations,—but this delay can have no result beyond some further sacrifice of lives.

With regard to the local prospects and general state of Spain under her new institutions, these have been lately so ably and fully developed by Lord Clarendon,—and on so much better and higher authority than could be brought to the subject in this sketch, that it would be superfluous

to attempt adding one word to his statement.—And when we consider the peculiar, and unequalled advantages possessed by the Noble Lord, during several years, towards forming just and sound views on the condition of that country, the purport of his excellent speech, which has naturally attracted so much attention both in Spain and England,—cannot but inspire the most gratifying anticipations.

Note—p. 39.

From Sir James Macgrigor's Medical History of the Peninsular Army.*

"On reference to the returns of *sick* and *wounded*, I find that from the 21st December, 1811, to 24th June, 1814, (30 months), 346,108 cases of disease or wounds, were treated in our hospitals."

"There appeared to be discharged cured from the hospitals, during the same period, 232,553. Invalided or sent for recovery of health, 4,586. Died of wounds or disease (in hospital), 18,513. This mortality, enormous as the number may appear at first sight, will not be thought great upon due consideration, and an explanation of attendant circumstances."

"On my way (says Sir James Macgrigor) from Madrid to Salamanca, in August, 1812, I met a detachment of the 43rd regiment proceeding to join their corps, and I learned that of 300 men landed at Lisbon, and immediately sent on to the army, little more than 30 men had got to Madrid, all the rest having either from fatigue or disease been left at the hospitals on their route."

Extract from the Surgical and Statistical History of the Legion, published by Deputy-Inspector Alcock, a Medical Officer of great ability, promise, and experience.

"Before the force marched from Bilbao, (Sept. 1835), a Medical Board, on which both the Inspector-General

* Chief Surgeon of the Army and present head of the Medical Board.

and myself sat, ascertained that upon an average 100 men in each regiment of infantry were either too young or too old for service, deformed, diseased, or crippled. Between 200 and 300 were invalided, as men absolutely and totally incapable of bearing arms. There were not means, it seemed, of embarking all, and the greater part even of these last, were still kept hanging on with the Legion. The system of recruiting adopted by the Spanish Government, so much per head, without the previous precaution of *responsible* examination by medical officers, led to this evil, which was soon found to be of great magnitude. During the ten days which a Medical Board sat, some of the oddest cases imaginable were brought before them. Now it was a stripling of fourteen years, and now an old soldier who had lost three fingers of his right hand, &c. &c."

"Wherever the blame may lie, the result was clear before us, that one-eighth at least of the whole force was unfit for service, and ought never to have been enlisted. We had in the ranks about a thousand men tainted, partially or totally disabled by disease, and the whole catalogue of the "disabilities for the British army"—and it is a long one, might have been run through with great facility. Of this number, two-thirds, I should think, died in the hospital, and the whole number, without probably ever doing one day's effective duty, merely served to swell the numerical returns of the force, and crowd to a fatal degree the hospitals."

"It may be remarked, in addition, that of those classed as *fit for service*, that is, neither crippled nor diseased, two-thirds only were in the flower of manhood, or such as would be accepted in the British service; the rest were either youths or elderly men."

Thus leaving about 4700 of all arms, such as would have been received in the British army

"Sir James Macgrigor, in his 'Sketch of the Medical History of the Peninsular War,' gives several parallel instances of the sickness and mortality of recruits, and particularly among artizans; and the recruits of the British army must always have been, as I shall have occasion to show, of a far superior class to the great proportion of those sent out for the Legion. He says, "The 7th regiment, in its nine first months in the country, lost 169 recruits out of 353," that is, nearly *one-half*. In the 40th regiment there were 104 deaths out of 450 recruits—a little less than one-fourth. "Yet," he adds, "no regiment on that service were more ably commanded, or better officered, than the Fusileers and 40th regiment." With respect to manufacturers and artizans, he further remarks, that, "of 358 recruits joining the 7th regiment in Portugal in 1810-11, 201 of them were artificers and manufacturers, and 152 had followed agricultural pursuits; in the course of a few months, 122 of the former and 62 of the latter died—the proportion being six out of ten in the artizans, and four out of ten in the agriculturists;" the one being a mortality of *more than one half*, the other less, but *more than a third*. This is a mortality fully equal to, if not exceeding, any which occurred in the Legion."

Sir J. Macgrigor states, that in making calculations for the field, 300 men who had served five years would be more effective and more to be depended on, than a regiment of 1000 men which had just arrived.

THE END.

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